Peter Bouteneff, Public Orthodoxy
It is commonly understood in the Orthodox Church that the bishop
represents the Church, particularly within its conciliar life. But can
he truly represent the Church, in its diversity, in every way and
context?
The bishop represents the Church in at least two ways: (1) He
distinguishes the local manifestation of the Universal Church from any
random gathering of like-minded individuals. (Ignatius’s second-century
epistles testify to this episcopal function with reference to the person
of Christ.) (2) He carries the duty to maintain continuity with the
apostolic faith, the traditio of right doctrine. The early church established a clear succession: Christ → Apostles → Bishops.
Our bishops live out that continuity in the roles they play in our
conciliar life. Councils developed as the Church’s foremost instrument
of insuring apostolic faith and order. Since the bishops are ex officio
charged with that task, the councils are constituted chiefly by
bishops. Councils function to define Church teaching, and also establish
its canonical order to determine its structures and govern its
members’ lives through directives about liturgy, fasting, marriage, and
so on.
The bishop’s diverse functions, each figuring into his role as
representative of the Church, require that he be equipped with
theological, administrative, moral, and pastoral discernment to properly
govern the Church. But a bishop’s living up to the high calling of his
office is not automatic; it is his responsibility. His consecration in
apostolic succession does not guarantee purity of faith, as we see in
the fates of Apollinarius, Nestorius, and countless others who fell into
heresy. Neither does it guarantee that he will maintain his moral
purity. The chief guarantee of a bishop’s rectitude resides in the mutual
accountability between Church and bishop, such that the Church abides
by bishops ruling in council, but also deposes any one of them who
grievously fails to hold to his calling—and thus fails to represent the
Church.
The bishop’s representation of the Church’s theology, order, and canonical life, therefore, is both a given of his episcopal office and rank, and also contingent on his deliberate and prayerful cultivation of the relevant aptitudes and skills, with the support of his flock.
That said, however, we should ask whether even a thoroughly righteous
man of prayer, trained in the Church’s theology, canon law, and
history, and a skilled administrator, can comprehensively represent the
concerns and lives of the Church’s young and old, rich and poor, married
and celibate, ordained and lay. Conciliar deliberations on Arianism or
Nestorianism may not require the Church’s entire diverse constituency,
but the issues under consideration at today’s councils surely do.
Types of Representation
The Great and Holy Council that assembled in Crete last June tested
the capacity of bishops to represent aspects of the Church in several
ways. When the churches of Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Antioch each
elected to sit out the Council, it was proposed that the Council convene
anyway, that each represent the totality of Orthodoxy. Yet the absent
churches have rejected the Council’s authority: why? Because they were not represented
there. They clearly believe that bishops of one local church cannot
represent the bishops of another. Several other groups from within
Churches who were present likewise felt under-represented and un-spoken for.
But let us consider a few other Church constituencies who were not at
the council in person. The largest such group by far is women. Women,
who constitute over 50% of the Orthodox Church, were represented by
around five members of the more than four hundred people constituting
the Churches’ delegations and advisors. A woman I know mentioned this to
a bishop as a problem. He responded by saying that he (a) by being a
bishop, and (b) as one who regularly visits his parishes and listens to
his people, represents women as well as men. “Don’t I represent you?” he
asked?
Well, yes he does. But, also, emphatically no he doesn’t.
In a groundbreaking essay emanating from postcolonial theory, Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak highlighted two definitions of representation. One
is conveyed by the German Vertreten, which carries a political sense: one person acting as proxy for another. The other is Darstellen, which conveys re-presentation, more like a portrait, which theologians might liken to perikhoresis.
The Trinitarian co-inherence is such that our Lord Jesus Christ can say
to Philip, “He who has seen me has seen the Father” (John 14:9). Jesus
re-presents the Father perfectly, not by proxy.
Both kinds of representation are appropriate and realistic depending
on given situations. In the political and ecclesiastical spheres we
choose persons to undertake our concerns in the “proxy” sense. In other
settings, such as in courts of law, we do well to be there in person,
even as we are assisted in our representation by an attorney. The
problem arises when people confuse the two forms of representation,
especially when they assume that proxy is qualitatively the same as true
re-presentation.
Russia, Bulgaria, Georgia, and Antioch could have been represented at the Crete Council by proxy (Vertreten),
had they so deputized bishops from other localities. But they insisted
that they needed to speak on their own behalf, else the Council would
not be universally representative. As regards women, the bishop who told
my friend that he represented women did indeed represent all Orthodox
Christians, by proxy (Vertreten). But without a woman’s life
experience, cultural constraints, and physical nature, the bishop should
recognize that he cannot be a voice for any woman, much less all women
in the sense of Darstellen.
Considerations
This raises important questions. The first concerns the
representation of people for whom decisions are being made. When a
council considers “the churches in the diaspora,” should it not feature a
considerable delegation who can speak directly to the “diaspora’s”
actual ecclesiastical and pastoral needs? When a council considers
divorce and remarriage of clergy, can those decisions really best be
taken by persons who, despite their wisdom and pastoral sensitivity, are
celibate men? Lived experience is irreplaceable. Realistically, we must
acknowledge that the men we elect, in trust and love, as our
bishop-representatives cannot fully represent mothers affected by
domestic violence, the disabled, the homeless and/or destitute,
blue-collar workers, clergy wives, etc., who will be profoundly affected
by the canons on which they are deciding. Bishops may represent canon
law directly, but they can only represent the Church’s diverse
membership, by greater or lesser abstraction.
My second question concerns diversity, generally. Our global councils honor the ecclesiastical
universality of representation. Should we not also be concerned with
portraying the diversity among and within our churches? Whether or not
geographically or ethnically sensitive issues are being decided, a
deliberative discussion ought properly to re-present the full
diversity-in-unity of the Orthodox Church. We want the diversity of
married and celibate, male and female, ordained and lay, cultural and
ethnic backgrounds. Without them, the Council operates purely on an
abstract, “proxy” level, not the “perikhoretic.”
Bishops do represent the Church, and they should continue to be the
lead participants of our formal councils. But all of us, especially our
bishops, ought to recognize the nature and limits of their de facto capacity
to represent us all. That means that our churches should reconsider how
to assemble their delegations and advisory bodies. Those on site at
Crete displayed little or no diversity in gender, status of ordination,
and many other crucial demographics. They represented the Orthodox
Church by proxy. It is time to that we take steps to create a truer
re-presentation?
Peter Bouteneff is Professor of Systematic Theology at St. Vladimir’s Orthodox Theological Seminary.