by Fr. Bohdan Hladio
The historical path of the Church in Ukraine is controverted and complex: both Moscow and Constantinople
claim Ukraine as their canonical territory. As a result, one of the
largest Orthodox Churches in the world has experienced schism for over
twenty-five years.
In April 2018 the Government of Ukraine officially requested a Tomos
of Autocephaly for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine from the Ecumenical
Patriarchate. This news brought joy to some, and caused anxiety for
others.
In response, the Synod of Bishops of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) (UOC-MP) published an “Appeal to the Faithful of the UOC” on May 25 2018 (English translation). Sadly, this document contributes little towards the normalization of the ecclesial scene in Ukraine.
The Appeal refers to a “schism in Ukrainian Orthodoxy,” implicitly
recognizing that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine extends beyond the
borders of the canonically recognized Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction,
which is useful. Other statements, however, portray the struggle for
Church unity somewhat disingenuously.
The Appeal speaks of “our Church,” and, since the UOC-MP is a
constituent part of the Moscow Patriarchate, this term can only mean
“Moscow Patriarchate.” Since approximately one third of the total number
of parishes of the Moscow Patriarchate are in Ukraine, it is reasonable
that UOC-MP bishops would react negatively to the idea of autocephaly,
because the loss of so many parishes would clearly weaken the prestige
and authority of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Not surprisingly, in paragraph four the Appeal contends that “The
most important criterion in the approval of all Church decisions is the
benefit of the Church,” emphasizing that this relates first and foremost
to the “individual Local Orthodox Church,” that is, the Moscow
Patriarchate (which is never mentioned by name in this document).
In paragraph nine we read that “autocephalous status is given to the
entire Church within the borders of a particular territory.” But to
what territory does this refer? Ukraine has been a sovereign,
independent country since 1991. The “particular territory” claimed by
the autocephalous Moscow Patriarchate is more or less identical to that
of the defunct Russian Empire and the Soviet Union.
Further, the Synodal Appeal states that “The history of the Church
witnesses to the fact that . . . attempts at unity which proceed ‘from
above’ were often not accepted by the churchly people”; contends that in
such cases the “temples emptied out”; and that such a unity was not
accepted by “the people.” This statement is patently false, as the
history of the bestowal of autocephaly to the Orthodox Churches in the
Balkans, Poland, and Czechoslovakia attests. This is not to say that all
examples of “unity from above” are uncontroversial, but, in fact, all
of the “new” autocephalous churches achieved their independence in
exactly this manner.
When Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians and Romanians freed themselves from
Ottoman domination, and when the Polish state was formed after World War
I, these “territories” were recognized as possessing the necessary
attributes for autocephalous status. In each case (as indeed earlier for
Muscovy), autocephalous status was achieved with the active support, if
not at the behest of, civil authorities.
The Synod of the UOC-MP expresses concern regarding the potential
creation of parallel jurisdictions in Ukraine. This situation exists
almost universally outside of traditionally Orthodox countries and,
judging by the pace at which this canonical anomaly is being addressed
by the Local Orthodox Churches, with occasional exceptions it does not
seem to be a matter of grave concern for either hierarchs or faithful.
Indeed, when bestowing the Tomos of Autocephaly to the Orthodox Church
in America in 1970, the Moscow Patriarchate actively supported the
creation of parallel jurisdictions, permitting parishes in North America
to remain within the jurisdiction of Moscow if they wished. The same
situation has existed with the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia
since 2007. Is what’s good for the goose not also good for the gander?
Perhaps most disappointingly, the Appeal claims that the UOC-MP is
open to “constructive cooperation and dialogue with the goal of
attaining Church unity”: but the dialogue that has actually taken place
over the last 25 years has been, by all outward indications, minimal and
superficial. If the UOC-MP truly is interested in overcoming the
schism, one might expect that it would have actively taken steps to
organize dialogues and foster healthy inter-church relationships,
cultivating mutual trust and understanding with the non-canonical
Orthodox Churches of Ukraine. This has not been done.
The document rightly emphasizes the need for “conciliar discussion of
important Church questions.” But the word “conciliar” takes on great
weight if it assumes participation by all Orthodox Ukrainians.
According to sociological surveys, while the UOC-MP currently has about
twice as many parishes as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church – Kyivan
Patriarchate (UOC-KP), the number of faithful who self-identify as
members of the UOC-MP has been dropping constantly. Those identifying as
members of the UOC-KP have been growing, to the point that they now
outnumber the members of the “canonical Church” almost two to one. Is
it not reasonable that the voices of the non-recognized Churches be
heard as well?
The Appeal of the UOC-MP does not contribute to Orthodox
reconciliation in Ukraine. The document simply repeats the
twenty-five-year-old “party line” of Moscow: “the return of the
schismatic groups” to the Moscow Patriarchate is necessary before there
can be any discussion of the status of the UOC etc. Its main goal seems
to be to discourage the faithful of the UOC-MP from “jumping ship,” and
to suggest that autocephaly would cause conflict in Ukraine and even
threaten world peace (the Appeal twice claims that the prospect of
autocephaly is being used as “an instrument in a geopolitical war”)!
Rather than embracing the bestowal of autocephaly as an opportunity
to overcome schism, respect political and cultural realities, and apply
the principles of Orthodox ecclesiology (such as they are) fairly and
equitably, this Appeal is simply another attempt to maintain a status
quo that contributes to division, rather than reconciliation and healing
within the Church of Christ.
Fr. Bohdan Hladio is a priest of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Canada, currently serving in Oshawa, Ontario. Besides his pastoral work he has served on many diocesan boards and committees, and has authored one book as well as numerous articles. He is currently completing a Master’s degree at the Orthodox School of Theology, Trinity College, in Toronto.
Public Orthodoxy seeks to promote conversation by providing a forum for diverse perspectives on contemporary issues related to Orthodox Christianity. The positions expressed in this essay are solely the author’s and do not necessarily represent the views of the editors or the Orthodox Christian Studies Center.