The rupture of sacramental communion between the Patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople over the “Ukrainian issue” risks triggering potentially irreparable processes of laceration
The past patronal feast of St Andrew (November 30), celebrated as every year in Istanbul by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, this time had as a "Stone Guest" the flood of political-ecclesial tensions surrounding the establishing of the autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church, soon to be removed from the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Moscow. The last days of November, in view of the feast of the patron saint, showed a clear acceleration of the processes of laceration. Now, unless a miracle, the Orthodox brothers are bound to proceed on separate ways towards next Christmas. The fracture of ecclesial communion is no longer just a specter or a threat, but is beginning to take shape.
The pressing game of Poroshenko
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has never hidden that the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is of crucial importance in his national political project, and he wants this to be achieved as soon as possible, perhaps even before the end of the year. On Thursday 29 November, in a speech on TV, Poroshenko said that "the Ukrainian state has done everything it could and should have done to have the Tomos" (the document with which the Ecumenical Patriarchate will recognize the autocephaly / independence of the Ukrainian Church). The Ukrainian leader said that Moscow officials - including those of the secret services - were "ready to do anything" to stop the process, "but the Lord is with us, while we are conducting a just struggle for our independence".
Taken by the solemnity of the moment, the Ukrainian president also announced that the text of the Tomos "has already been approved" and that the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was about to announce the date of the assembly of metropolitans and bishops of the different Ukrainian Orthodox components to achieve their "unification". Before the feast of Saint Andrew, while the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was in progress, Poroshenko had also sent to Istanbul his advisor Rostislav Pavlenko, director of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, who on 26 November was received by Patriarch Bartholomew, and said that he had had with him "a long and cordial conversation on the events in Ukraine and the final steps to arrive at the Tomos on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church". Then, in more precise and calm words - compared to Poroshenko's announcements, his advisor Pavlenko also explained that Patriarch Bartholomew "will deliver the Tomos for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to her prime when he is elected. That is why the text cannot be published yet".
The confirmations of Bartholomew
On 29 November, even the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, receiving an international Orthodox interparliamentary delegation in Istanbul, confirmed that the Synod of the Patriarchate had examined and approved the statute of the future Ukrainian Orthodox autocephalous Church, and that the assembly of unification and election of the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox autocephalous Church will take place by December. The new Ukrainian primate, once elected, will go to Istanbul to receive the Tomos from the hands of the Ecumenical Patriarch. "It is a purely administrative fact that does not influence the magisterium of the Orthodox Church", Bartholomew explained. But the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church are not of the same opinion. And their reaction seems furious.
The "who's with who" lottery
The spokespersons of the Moscow Patriarchate insist that some of the 14 existing autocephalous Orthodox Churches have expressed opposition and doubts about the process initiated for the granting of autocephaly to an Ukrainian Orthodox Church. On 19 October the Serbian Patriarch Irinej and that of Antioch Yohanna X had already invited the Patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople to rediscover the path of "fraternal dialogue". More recently, on 12 November, the assembly of Serbian Orthodox bishops defined as "canonically unfounded" Bartholomew's decision to re-establish full communion with the two Ukrainian ecclesial structures - led respectively by Metropolitan Filaret Denishenko (who since 1995 has assumed the title of "Patriarch of Kiev") and Bishop Makarij Maletic, 1991 head of the so-called Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox Church - which until now were considered as schismatic entities by the rest of Orthodoxy. The Serbian bishops also asked to deal with the issue of the granting of autocephaly in a new Pan-Orthodox Council, after the one held in Crete in 2016, which had suffered a sudden boycott by the Patriarchate of Moscow.
In their media statements, the representatives of the Russian Orthodoxy are certain that the bishops and communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church linked to the Moscow Patriarchate will not leave Moscow's jurisdiction to join the project of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. So far, of the more than 80 bishops of the Ukrainian Church linked to Moscow, only three have expressed their favor for the process aimed at affirming the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Among the three is Bishop Simeon of Vinnitsa and Bar, challenged for his choice by priests and faithful of his diocese.
The "duplication" strategy
When Patriarch Bartholomew restored in their rank Filaret and Makarij, the heads of the two "non canonical" Churches considered schismatic not only by the Russian Orthodox, the Patriarchate of Moscow responded by breaking the Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since then, the "Ukrainian issue" has surpassed the level of tests of strength and disputes in ecclesiastical politics, reaching much more vital levels. The wise Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana, esteemed primate of the small Orthodox Church of Albania, noticed this and on 23 November last disclosed - mainly to avoid any partisan manipulation - the two letters he had sent on the Ukrainian issue to Russian Patriarch Kirill. In the first, written on 10 October, Anastasios defined the project to guarantee autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodoxy as a "march in a minefield", which instead of achieving unity among all Ukrainian Orthodox communities could caused the break-up of unity in the Orthodox Ecumene. In the second letter, written on 7 November last, Anastasios expressed all his sorrow at the decision of the Patriarchate of Moscow to suspend sacramental communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. "It is unthinkable", the Orthodox primate of Albania wrote, "that the divine Eucharist, the mystery par excellence of the infinite love and total humiliation of Christ can be used as a weapon against another Church". "How is it possible - Anastasios added - that the decision and order of the Hierarchy of the Church of Russia can erase the energy of the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox churches that operate under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate? How is it possible that the Divine Eucharist administered in the churches of Asia Minor, Crete, the Holy Mountain, and everywhere on earth, may become inconsistent for the Russian Orthodox faithful? And if they approach with "fear of God, faith and charity" to share the Holy gifts, how is it possible that they are indeed committing a "sin", of which they should actually confess?
The rupture of sacramental communion between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Patriarchate of Constantinople risks triggering potentially irreparable processes of laceration. Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk is travelling all over the world (Korea, Crete, Greece, but also China, North Korea and South Korea) also with the intention of developing a global pastoral network that is part of the Patriarchate of Moscow, and that has no sharing at sacramental level with the bishops and churches linked to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This "Russian" pastoral network aims to extend to those countries and areas where until now Orthodox Christians tied to the Patriarchate of Moscow, in the absence of parishes of the Russian Church, attended churches under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
An analogous criterion of "separation and duplication" seems to inspire the heads of the Russian Orthodox Church also in relations with other Churches and ecclesial institutions. As long as the break with Constantinople lasts, the Patriarchate of Moscow will not take part in the dialogues and relations involving the Orthodox Church as a whole, and where the role of representation and coordination is exercised by the Ecumenical Patriarch or his delegates. The Patriarchate of Moscow appears intent on consolidating bilateral relations with the heads of the other Churches, starting with the Church of Rome. Metropolitan Hilarion has already cancelled all further Russian participation in the theological dialogue conducted for years by the Joint Catholic-Orthodox Commission on the themes of primacy and synodality. At the same time, next February, delegations from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy See will make exchange visits on the occasion of the third anniversary of the meeting between the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill and Pope Francis in Havana on 12 February 2016. The Russian intention seems to be that of renewing every year the exchange visits of official delegations between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Holy See in conjunction with the anniversary of the meeting in Cuba between Kirill and Francis, in a similar way to what is repeated each year with the exchange visits between the Church of Rome and the Church of Constantinople, on the occasion of the respective feasts of the patron saints of Saints Peter and Paul and of Saint Andrew.
In his visit to the Fanar, on 30 November 2014, Pope Francis said that in order to reach the goal of full unity with Orthodox Christians the Catholic Church "does not intend to impose any requirement, except that of the profession of the common faith". In the Pope's opinion, the restoration of full communion between Catholics and Orthodox was already possible then, without the need to ask the Orthodox brothers for pre-conditions of a theological or jurisdictional nature. Now, precisely because of questions and conflicts of jurisdiction, the profession of common faith no longer seems to guarantee full sacramental unity even within the Orthodox Churches. And as a result also the path towards full sacramental communion between Catholic and Orthodox Christians appears again (and becomes objectively) more difficult.
The pressing game of Poroshenko
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has never hidden that the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is of crucial importance in his national political project, and he wants this to be achieved as soon as possible, perhaps even before the end of the year. On Thursday 29 November, in a speech on TV, Poroshenko said that "the Ukrainian state has done everything it could and should have done to have the Tomos" (the document with which the Ecumenical Patriarchate will recognize the autocephaly / independence of the Ukrainian Church). The Ukrainian leader said that Moscow officials - including those of the secret services - were "ready to do anything" to stop the process, "but the Lord is with us, while we are conducting a just struggle for our independence".
Taken by the solemnity of the moment, the Ukrainian president also announced that the text of the Tomos "has already been approved" and that the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was about to announce the date of the assembly of metropolitans and bishops of the different Ukrainian Orthodox components to achieve their "unification". Before the feast of Saint Andrew, while the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate was in progress, Poroshenko had also sent to Istanbul his advisor Rostislav Pavlenko, director of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, who on 26 November was received by Patriarch Bartholomew, and said that he had had with him "a long and cordial conversation on the events in Ukraine and the final steps to arrive at the Tomos on the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church". Then, in more precise and calm words - compared to Poroshenko's announcements, his advisor Pavlenko also explained that Patriarch Bartholomew "will deliver the Tomos for the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to her prime when he is elected. That is why the text cannot be published yet".
The confirmations of Bartholomew
On 29 November, even the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, receiving an international Orthodox interparliamentary delegation in Istanbul, confirmed that the Synod of the Patriarchate had examined and approved the statute of the future Ukrainian Orthodox autocephalous Church, and that the assembly of unification and election of the primate of the Ukrainian Orthodox autocephalous Church will take place by December. The new Ukrainian primate, once elected, will go to Istanbul to receive the Tomos from the hands of the Ecumenical Patriarch. "It is a purely administrative fact that does not influence the magisterium of the Orthodox Church", Bartholomew explained. But the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church are not of the same opinion. And their reaction seems furious.
The "who's with who" lottery
The spokespersons of the Moscow Patriarchate insist that some of the 14 existing autocephalous Orthodox Churches have expressed opposition and doubts about the process initiated for the granting of autocephaly to an Ukrainian Orthodox Church. On 19 October the Serbian Patriarch Irinej and that of Antioch Yohanna X had already invited the Patriarchates of Moscow and Constantinople to rediscover the path of "fraternal dialogue". More recently, on 12 November, the assembly of Serbian Orthodox bishops defined as "canonically unfounded" Bartholomew's decision to re-establish full communion with the two Ukrainian ecclesial structures - led respectively by Metropolitan Filaret Denishenko (who since 1995 has assumed the title of "Patriarch of Kiev") and Bishop Makarij Maletic, 1991 head of the so-called Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox Church - which until now were considered as schismatic entities by the rest of Orthodoxy. The Serbian bishops also asked to deal with the issue of the granting of autocephaly in a new Pan-Orthodox Council, after the one held in Crete in 2016, which had suffered a sudden boycott by the Patriarchate of Moscow.
In their media statements, the representatives of the Russian Orthodoxy are certain that the bishops and communities of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church linked to the Moscow Patriarchate will not leave Moscow's jurisdiction to join the project of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church. So far, of the more than 80 bishops of the Ukrainian Church linked to Moscow, only three have expressed their favor for the process aimed at affirming the autocephaly of Ukrainian Orthodoxy. Among the three is Bishop Simeon of Vinnitsa and Bar, challenged for his choice by priests and faithful of his diocese.
The "duplication" strategy
When Patriarch Bartholomew restored in their rank Filaret and Makarij, the heads of the two "non canonical" Churches considered schismatic not only by the Russian Orthodox, the Patriarchate of Moscow responded by breaking the Eucharistic communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Since then, the "Ukrainian issue" has surpassed the level of tests of strength and disputes in ecclesiastical politics, reaching much more vital levels. The wise Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana, esteemed primate of the small Orthodox Church of Albania, noticed this and on 23 November last disclosed - mainly to avoid any partisan manipulation - the two letters he had sent on the Ukrainian issue to Russian Patriarch Kirill. In the first, written on 10 October, Anastasios defined the project to guarantee autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodoxy as a "march in a minefield", which instead of achieving unity among all Ukrainian Orthodox communities could caused the break-up of unity in the Orthodox Ecumene. In the second letter, written on 7 November last, Anastasios expressed all his sorrow at the decision of the Patriarchate of Moscow to suspend sacramental communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. "It is unthinkable", the Orthodox primate of Albania wrote, "that the divine Eucharist, the mystery par excellence of the infinite love and total humiliation of Christ can be used as a weapon against another Church". "How is it possible - Anastasios added - that the decision and order of the Hierarchy of the Church of Russia can erase the energy of the Holy Spirit in the Orthodox churches that operate under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate? How is it possible that the Divine Eucharist administered in the churches of Asia Minor, Crete, the Holy Mountain, and everywhere on earth, may become inconsistent for the Russian Orthodox faithful? And if they approach with "fear of God, faith and charity" to share the Holy gifts, how is it possible that they are indeed committing a "sin", of which they should actually confess?
The rupture of sacramental communion between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Patriarchate of Constantinople risks triggering potentially irreparable processes of laceration. Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk is travelling all over the world (Korea, Crete, Greece, but also China, North Korea and South Korea) also with the intention of developing a global pastoral network that is part of the Patriarchate of Moscow, and that has no sharing at sacramental level with the bishops and churches linked to the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. This "Russian" pastoral network aims to extend to those countries and areas where until now Orthodox Christians tied to the Patriarchate of Moscow, in the absence of parishes of the Russian Church, attended churches under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.
An analogous criterion of "separation and duplication" seems to inspire the heads of the Russian Orthodox Church also in relations with other Churches and ecclesial institutions. As long as the break with Constantinople lasts, the Patriarchate of Moscow will not take part in the dialogues and relations involving the Orthodox Church as a whole, and where the role of representation and coordination is exercised by the Ecumenical Patriarch or his delegates. The Patriarchate of Moscow appears intent on consolidating bilateral relations with the heads of the other Churches, starting with the Church of Rome. Metropolitan Hilarion has already cancelled all further Russian participation in the theological dialogue conducted for years by the Joint Catholic-Orthodox Commission on the themes of primacy and synodality. At the same time, next February, delegations from the Russian Orthodox Church and the Holy See will make exchange visits on the occasion of the third anniversary of the meeting between the Patriarch of Moscow Kirill and Pope Francis in Havana on 12 February 2016. The Russian intention seems to be that of renewing every year the exchange visits of official delegations between the Patriarchate of Moscow and the Holy See in conjunction with the anniversary of the meeting in Cuba between Kirill and Francis, in a similar way to what is repeated each year with the exchange visits between the Church of Rome and the Church of Constantinople, on the occasion of the respective feasts of the patron saints of Saints Peter and Paul and of Saint Andrew.
In his visit to the Fanar, on 30 November 2014, Pope Francis said that in order to reach the goal of full unity with Orthodox Christians the Catholic Church "does not intend to impose any requirement, except that of the profession of the common faith". In the Pope's opinion, the restoration of full communion between Catholics and Orthodox was already possible then, without the need to ask the Orthodox brothers for pre-conditions of a theological or jurisdictional nature. Now, precisely because of questions and conflicts of jurisdiction, the profession of common faith no longer seems to guarantee full sacramental unity even within the Orthodox Churches. And as a result also the path towards full sacramental communion between Catholic and Orthodox Christians appears again (and becomes objectively) more difficult.