Fr. Cyril Hovorun, ''Pastoral Care for the Ukrainian Orthodox'', in The
Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukraine Autocephaly, Evagelos Sotiropoulos,
Editor, May 2019, ORDER OF SAINT ANDREW THE APOSTLE, ARCHONS OF THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE, pp. 41-46.
Ukrainian people are among the most religious in Europe. According to the study “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe” conducted in 2017 by the Pew Research Center, 78% of the entire Ukrainian population identify as Orthodox. Twelve per cent attend church weekly, which is twice as many as in Russia, by comparison. Religious affiliations and practices are not spread evenly in Ukraine, however. Those people who live in the western regions of the country go to the church more frequently than those who live in the east.
Unfortunately, the most religious regions of Ukraine’s west, such as Volhynia, were affected most severely by the ecclesiastical schism that happened soon after Ukraine regained its independence in 1991. Millions of devoted Orthodox Christians, who regularly attend church and participate in the sacraments, found themselves cut off from the communion with global Orthodoxy. Social sciences can measure religiosity quantitively, but not qualitatively. When it comes to the quality of religious life, one can be only subjective.
Unfortunately, the most religious regions of Ukraine’s west, such as Volhynia, were affected most severely by the ecclesiastical schism that happened soon after Ukraine regained its independence in 1991. Millions of devoted Orthodox Christians, who regularly attend church and participate in the sacraments, found themselves cut off from the communion with global Orthodoxy. Social sciences can measure religiosity quantitively, but not qualitatively. When it comes to the quality of religious life, one can be only subjective.
From my many meetings and conversations with the lay faithful from the Patriarchate of Kyiv and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, I came to the conclusion that their religious life is intensive and yet healthy. It does not feature any significant fanatical or fundamentalist approach. Most “non - canonical” Orthodox that I met were open -minded, appreciating others, and loving Christ. At the same time, they had to face relentless accusations of being “schismatics” and deprived of any saving grace. They were declared non-church. Even their baptism was questioned by their “canonical” Orthodox brothers and sisters. Some cases of how the “non - canonical” Orthodox Christians were treated are outrageous, as evidenced by the following example. 2
On December 31, 2017, in the city of Zaporizhia, a 39-year old man committed suicide by jumping from the 8th floor of a building. He fell on a 2-year old boy who was walking nearby with his father. Both the man and the boy died immediately. Stricken by unbearable grief, the parents of the boy came to a church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine to arrange a burial service. When they mentioned to the priest that the boy had been baptized in the Kyiv Patriarchate, the priest categorically refused to offer the boy commemoration service. They went to another church, also of the Moscow Patriarchate. There, the priests also asked them to leave the church without offering any pastoral assistance. The priests of the Moscow Patriarchate, who demonstrated such an attitude to the grief-stricken parents, were completely supported by their bishop, Metropolitan Luka Kovalenko, and later on by the synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The synod at its session on March 14, 2018, approved the decisions made by the priests in Zaporizhia and stated that the church services can be offered only to the baptized members of the church.3
The “schismatics” for the synod were not a church and not even baptized. Such an attitude was for decades a heavy burden on the consciousness of those faithful who belonged to the unrecognized Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The hostile attitude towards the unrecognized churches from the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine increased under the leadership of Metropolitan Onufriy Berezovskiy, who in 2014 succeeded Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan (1935-2014). He has led his church to the self-imposed isolation from the Ukrainian society and other Ukrainian churches. During his tenure, attempts at developing relationships with other Christian groups became practically non-existent. In comparison, such attempts were repeatedly made under Metropolitan Volodymyr, although they were blocked, nevertheless, by Moscow, illustrated by the following example. From 2007 to 2009, I was the chairman of the Department for external church relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. In my position, I tried to establish a dialogue with the uncanonical groups in Ukraine, primarily the Patriarchate of Kyiv. In my attempts, I was completely supported by Metropolitan Volodymyr, who also wanted a genuine dialogue and rapprochement with other Christians in Ukraine. On September 9, 2009, the synod of the church under the leadership of Metropolitan Volodymyr adopted a decision to renew a commission for the dialogue with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and to establish a commission to discuss a possibility of dialogue with the Patriarchate of Kyiv.4
The initiative to set up both dialogues was mine, and it was supported by both Metropolitan Volodymyr and the synod of the church. This initiative, however, was not accepted by Moscow, which took drastic steps to prevent it. At the following session of its synod on October 10, 2009, the Russian Orthodox Church removed me from the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and placed me in Moscow.5
I did not give my consent for this decision and actually learned about it from the Internet. Following this synodal decision, there were no more genuine attempts for dialogue with the unrecognized churches in Ukraine. Nevertheless, from the side of the unrecognized churches, particularly the Patriarchate of Kyiv, attempts to contact Moscow in order to find a solution to the Ukrainian schism continued. Thus, the primate of this church (Filaret) approached the Russian Orthodox Church with a request to lift the anathemas, which had been imposed on him in 1997. On November 16, 2017, he sent a letter to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and the council of bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church (held from November 29 to December 2, 2017). In this letter, he asked for “forgiveness for everything that I have sinned by word, by deed, and by all my feelings. I also forgive everyone from the bottom of my heart.” Filaret asked the Russian church to “take proper decisions to put the end to the existent antagonism. Namely, to consider void all the decisions that impede the above-mentioned [reconciliation], including the ones about suspension and anathemas.” It is also noteworthy that Filaret signed his petition not as a patriarch or even a bishop, but as “co- brother.”6
On December 31, 2017, in the city of Zaporizhia, a 39-year old man committed suicide by jumping from the 8th floor of a building. He fell on a 2-year old boy who was walking nearby with his father. Both the man and the boy died immediately. Stricken by unbearable grief, the parents of the boy came to a church of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine to arrange a burial service. When they mentioned to the priest that the boy had been baptized in the Kyiv Patriarchate, the priest categorically refused to offer the boy commemoration service. They went to another church, also of the Moscow Patriarchate. There, the priests also asked them to leave the church without offering any pastoral assistance. The priests of the Moscow Patriarchate, who demonstrated such an attitude to the grief-stricken parents, were completely supported by their bishop, Metropolitan Luka Kovalenko, and later on by the synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. The synod at its session on March 14, 2018, approved the decisions made by the priests in Zaporizhia and stated that the church services can be offered only to the baptized members of the church.3
The “schismatics” for the synod were not a church and not even baptized. Such an attitude was for decades a heavy burden on the consciousness of those faithful who belonged to the unrecognized Orthodox churches in Ukraine. The hostile attitude towards the unrecognized churches from the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine increased under the leadership of Metropolitan Onufriy Berezovskiy, who in 2014 succeeded Metropolitan Volodymyr Sabodan (1935-2014). He has led his church to the self-imposed isolation from the Ukrainian society and other Ukrainian churches. During his tenure, attempts at developing relationships with other Christian groups became practically non-existent. In comparison, such attempts were repeatedly made under Metropolitan Volodymyr, although they were blocked, nevertheless, by Moscow, illustrated by the following example. From 2007 to 2009, I was the chairman of the Department for external church relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchate. In my position, I tried to establish a dialogue with the uncanonical groups in Ukraine, primarily the Patriarchate of Kyiv. In my attempts, I was completely supported by Metropolitan Volodymyr, who also wanted a genuine dialogue and rapprochement with other Christians in Ukraine. On September 9, 2009, the synod of the church under the leadership of Metropolitan Volodymyr adopted a decision to renew a commission for the dialogue with the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and to establish a commission to discuss a possibility of dialogue with the Patriarchate of Kyiv.4
The initiative to set up both dialogues was mine, and it was supported by both Metropolitan Volodymyr and the synod of the church. This initiative, however, was not accepted by Moscow, which took drastic steps to prevent it. At the following session of its synod on October 10, 2009, the Russian Orthodox Church removed me from the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and placed me in Moscow.5
I did not give my consent for this decision and actually learned about it from the Internet. Following this synodal decision, there were no more genuine attempts for dialogue with the unrecognized churches in Ukraine. Nevertheless, from the side of the unrecognized churches, particularly the Patriarchate of Kyiv, attempts to contact Moscow in order to find a solution to the Ukrainian schism continued. Thus, the primate of this church (Filaret) approached the Russian Orthodox Church with a request to lift the anathemas, which had been imposed on him in 1997. On November 16, 2017, he sent a letter to Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and the council of bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church (held from November 29 to December 2, 2017). In this letter, he asked for “forgiveness for everything that I have sinned by word, by deed, and by all my feelings. I also forgive everyone from the bottom of my heart.” Filaret asked the Russian church to “take proper decisions to put the end to the existent antagonism. Namely, to consider void all the decisions that impede the above-mentioned [reconciliation], including the ones about suspension and anathemas.” It is also noteworthy that Filaret signed his petition not as a patriarch or even a bishop, but as “co- brother.”6
Filaret effectively humiliated himself and implied that he is neither a recognized patriarch nor even a bishop. He made this step towards reconciliation despite the criticism this provoked in Ukrainian society. He was accused of “betraying the Ukrainian standpoint” in the conflict with Russia. He nevertheless did what no one expected him to do— make the first step towards the Russian church and asking it to give some solution to his personal issue of anathema and to the issue of the Ukrainian schism. The response of the Russian church, however, was cold and formal: the council of its bishops appointed a commission to consider the case,7 which was simply a way to say “no” to Filaret.
Filaret appealed to the council of the Russian bishops as an institution eligible to lift the anathema against him, because in 1997 a similar council had imposed anathema against him. That the council appointed a commission to study his case meant that the decision was postponed to at least the next council of bishops that would not be convened for several years. Filaret, who was then 88 years-old, could not wait and appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an institution, which could solve the problem that the Russian church refused to solve. This step, thus, was canonical and legitimate. Unlike the Russian church, which all of these years that the Ukrainian issue existed, only imitated giving solution to it, the Ecumenical Patriarchate offered an effective solution that put the end to the schism. At its session on October 9-11, 2018, the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate declared that the faithful of the non-canonical churches “have been restored to communion with the Church.”8
This was an important pastoral decision, which relieved millions of faithful Ukrainians from the consciousness of being second-class Christians. It also made impossible manipulations with their canonical status, like the one in Zaporizhia, where a child was refused burial service on the pretext of being baptized in a non-canonical church. By the same synodal decision, the primates of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Filaret and Makariy, respectively, were restored to the ranks of bishops. Constantinople did this in the frame of its own historical and canonical right to receive and review appeals from other Orthodox jurisdictions and to better establish pastoral care for the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine.
Filaret appealed to the council of the Russian bishops as an institution eligible to lift the anathema against him, because in 1997 a similar council had imposed anathema against him. That the council appointed a commission to study his case meant that the decision was postponed to at least the next council of bishops that would not be convened for several years. Filaret, who was then 88 years-old, could not wait and appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an institution, which could solve the problem that the Russian church refused to solve. This step, thus, was canonical and legitimate. Unlike the Russian church, which all of these years that the Ukrainian issue existed, only imitated giving solution to it, the Ecumenical Patriarchate offered an effective solution that put the end to the schism. At its session on October 9-11, 2018, the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate declared that the faithful of the non-canonical churches “have been restored to communion with the Church.”8
This was an important pastoral decision, which relieved millions of faithful Ukrainians from the consciousness of being second-class Christians. It also made impossible manipulations with their canonical status, like the one in Zaporizhia, where a child was refused burial service on the pretext of being baptized in a non-canonical church. By the same synodal decision, the primates of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, Filaret and Makariy, respectively, were restored to the ranks of bishops. Constantinople did this in the frame of its own historical and canonical right to receive and review appeals from other Orthodox jurisdictions and to better establish pastoral care for the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine.
1. https://www.pewforum.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/05/CEUP-FULL-REPORT.pdf
2. https://www.christiantimes.com/article/moscow-led-church-in-ukraine-refuses-to-bury-boy-because-he-was-christened-in-a-rival-denomination/73505.htm.
3. Minutes #1: http://sinod.church.ua/2018/04/26/zhurnali-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-sinodu-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-14-bereznya-2018-roku/
4. Minutes #45: http://sinod.church.ua/2014/01/15/zasidannya-9-veresnya-2009-roku/#more-1180
5. Minutes #97: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/810642.html
6. https://www.facebook.com/yevstr/posts/1478723815509231
7. Definition of the council of bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5074551.html
8. Communique of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: https://www.patriarchate.org/-/communiq-1
2. https://www.christiantimes.com/article/moscow-led-church-in-ukraine-refuses-to-bury-boy-because-he-was-christened-in-a-rival-denomination/73505.htm.
3. Minutes #1: http://sinod.church.ua/2018/04/26/zhurnali-zasidannya-svyashhennogo-sinodu-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-cerkvi-vid-14-bereznya-2018-roku/
4. Minutes #45: http://sinod.church.ua/2014/01/15/zasidannya-9-veresnya-2009-roku/#more-1180
5. Minutes #97: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/810642.html
6. https://www.facebook.com/yevstr/posts/1478723815509231
7. Definition of the council of bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church: http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/5074551.html
8. Communique of the Ecumenical Patriarchate: https://www.patriarchate.org/-/communiq-1