FR. JOHN CHRYSSAVGIS, ''Pastoral Perspectives of the Ukrainian Autocephaly: A Personal Face to a Political Issue'', in The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukraine Autocephaly, Evagelos Sotiropoulos, Editor, May 2019, ORDER OF SAINT ANDREW THE APOSTLE, ARCHONS OF THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE, pp. 11-16.
In October 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate finallyaccepted the appeal by Ukrainian hierarchs for their restoration tocanonical status and for the readmission of their faithful to fullcommunion after a period of some two decades, during which timethey were excluded from communion with the rest of the Orthodox world. While much noise is made about these decisions being revolutionary or radical, it is important to remember that they didnot appear suddenly or unexpectedly. Among other considerations—including canonical and jurisdictional reasons,which are often emphasized—there are specific historical relationships and special pastoral perspectives that led to the recent decision on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate to grant autocephaly officially to the Orthodox Church in Ukraine January 5, 2019.Briefly, the official historical relationships include five centuries of intimate and immediate relations between Ukraine and its Mother Church of Constantinople from 988 to 1458 when the Russian Orthodox Church, which included the Ukraine,declared itself autocephalous.
There then followed a lengthy, often tumultuous association and alliance with the Ukrainian Orthodox and the Church of Moscow, especially in the twentieth-century when the state of Soviet Ukraine was part of the atheist Soviet Union. Regrettably, throughout the latter period and to this day,Ukraine became a battleground of Russian authoritarianism and territorialism. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of Ukrainian state independence in 1991(coincidentally also the year of the enthronement of Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew), Orthodox Christians in Ukraine once again pursued an independent church and an immediate relationship with the Phanar. The Patriarchate of Moscow,however, consistently denied their request, which resulted in breakaway churches and faithful out of communion for an entire generation.There after, for the ensuing period of almost three decades,the Ecumenical Patriarchate—and particularly Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew—encouraged and even entreated Moscowto heal the divisions in Ukraine. For years, the Ecumenical Patriarchate mediated conversations through a special consultation including Russian and Ukrainian hierarchs. Sadly, albeit not surprisingly, the Patriarchate of Moscow withdrew from those negotiations. The Phanar clearly and publicly outlined to Moscow that it could not ignore the appeal or abandon millions ofOrthodox faithful. The issue of autocephaly might have been discussed in a conciliar manner at the Holy and Great Council convened in Crete by the Ecumenical Patriarch in 2016; however,the churches–at Moscow’s insistence –agreed to withdraw theissue from the agenda.
The Wounded People
of God The tumult of these historical relationships led to thepastoral perspectives instrumental in the Ecumenical Patriarchate’s decision to grant autocephaly and what needed to be consideredfor healing to begin in Ukraine. In a hierarchal, patriarchal, and institutional church such as ours, it is easy to forget the fundamental principle and essential objective of the church as the healing presence and transforming grace of God in the world. Sooften, we are overwhelmed by the external politics or internal conflicts that influence and impact believers, who comprise the soul and support of the Orthodox Church throughout the world.Whether we refer to this as the personal or pastoral dimension ofchurch life, it is frequently overlooked in the heat of dissension andthe challenge of division.In my mind, then, the question of autocephaly in Ukrainetranscends the exercise of right or the exhibition of might. It isultimately about the priority of the people of God as the Body ofChrist and the pastoral care essential to heal the brokenness andpain of: 1) being out of communion or in schism; 2) beingmarginalized from governing decisions and administrative policies; 3) being isolated from one’s Orthodox brothers and sisters because of nationalism or an imbalanced relationship betweenchurch and state; and, 4) experiencing disappointment anddisillusionment when lay believers witness clergy not resolvingmatters in a spirit of humility and forgiveness.First, one must recognize with compassion the pain ofseparation and ostracization in Ukraine of— not just an individual bishop or isolated clergymen, and even a specific synod orparticular bishops, but — an entire population of many millionswhose sacramental life had been labeled invalid. No one has theright to assign an entire generation of parishes and faithful to hell by branding them as schismatics.
Thus, the restoration ofsanctioned communion by the Ecumenical Patriarch to OrthodoxChristians in Ukraine was pastorally vital. Unfortunately, after therecognition of autocephaly, the Russian Orthodox Church responded by breaking communion with all the churches underthe Ecumenical Patriarchate, thereby further inflicting unnecessarypain on more people around the world who had communed andworshipped with each other for many years. A genuine pastoralperspective requires recognition of the pain that excommunicationinflicts and prayer for its healing.Secondly, one cannot ignore the sense of marginalizationthat many people feel in matters of governance in the church. Ofcourse, the Orthodox Church can hardly pretend to functiondemocratically, even at its most conciliar expression. Instead, atleast at its best, it resembles a synodal dialogue among brother bishops and a mutual interdependence between hierarchy andlaity. Still, the power to discern authority and authenticity in thechurch—what the Orthodox Liturgy calls “rightly dividing the word of truth”—is granted not so much to a hierarchal synod inisolation, still less to any hierarch individually, but to the entire people of God: “It seemed good to the apostles and elders with all the Church” (Acts 15:28). This was the
mindset of the Holy andGreat Council of 2016 at which four autocephalous churchestragically refused at the very last minute to attend. Healingrequires pastoral recognition of the importance of inclusion (of both clergy and laity) and eventually the convening of a council todeal not only with matters of governance but to reflect on thechurch’s role and responsibility in a modern, pluralistic society.
Third, I would submit that, while issues of autocephaly andauthority over geographical regions and jurisdictional territories,as well as the attending questions about canonical validity oforders and the punitive consequences of schisms, are doubtlessvital to the unity and maturity of the Orthodox Church, mostpeople—including many Orthodox themselves, along with certain bishops involved in the current crisis—are actually unaware thatthe importance of these issues actually pales in comparison to the plight of isolationism and nationalism that have plaguedOrthodoxy in recent centuries. These problems of isolationism andnationalism are what also define the context of the situation inUkraine.
What became amply apparent at the Holy and GreatCouncil of 2016 under monumental and appalling pressure —was that the Orthodox Church would neither readily nor voluntaril yenter the twenty-first century without stubborn resistance, evenfierce resentment. For me, the Church of Russia missed a vital opportunity to demonstrate true leadership at the Council,especially after it had already obstinately skewed its agenda anddocuments. The Great Council may have been, but was not primarily about unity. Orthodox Christians may congratulate themselves about the oneness of the Church in doctrine and sacrament, whichhas long provided a lucrative selling point to outsiders, while hauntingly persisting as an elusive romantic notion for insiders. I funity and canonicity are anything but legalistic or pharisaic, then Orthodox Christians must surely admit their failure and hypocrisyon this level. So it is futile and fruitless to wave unity as a banner of protest or defense whenever internal problems arise.Regrettably, it is more convenient for Orthodox to dispute territorial boundaries than discuss contemporary issues. There is agreater security in priding ourselves on our liturgy and spirituali tythan collaborating to transcend parochialism and prejudice.
Fourth, from the people’s perspective—the one of laity andeven many clergy watching from the sidelines— the inability of bishops to transcend their fixation on power and money, or jurisdictional and territorial control, results in profounddisappointment and disillusionment. They see bishops serving inlong liturgies, asking each other for forgiveness, and in the sameday hypocritically engaging in struggles for power and revenge. Such clergy fall exceedingly short of being Christ-like models, whoresolve matters in humility and forgiveness. Unfortunately, many believers pull away from the church when they witness such
behavior. To restore the people’s trust and the clergy’s integrity,
the pastoral ministry in the Body of Christ urgently needs toassume priority.
The Guiding Grace of God
My humble experience in the church is reassuring; therecognition that the grace of God guides the church and neverabandons the church remains comforting. It is the hope and prayerof many millions that church leaders in both Russia and Ukrainewill embrace the present moment as an opportunity of growth, enrichment, and solidarity for all of God’s people in a region that has endured far too much suffering and among nations that havefar more to gain from complementarity than conflict, both nationaland ecclesiastical.The pastoral perspective is crucial in the current situation ofUkraine. For his part, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew feltresponsible for restoring millions of Orthodox to communion. Thechurch should always seek to embrace the spiritual interests of itsfaithful. The church should never serve as a vehicle to promote itsown ambitious interests; and it should definitely not pursue orprotect the interests of a state.