FR. NICHOLAS DENYSENKO, ''Penalty or Abuse of Power? Canonical Sanctions and Ukrainian Autocephaly'', in The Ecumenical Patriarchate and Ukraine Autocephaly, Evagelos Sotiropoulos, Editor, May 2019, ORDER OF SAINT ANDREW THE APOSTLE, ARCHONS OF THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE, pp. 17-26.
On October 11, 2018, the Ecumenical Patriarchate issued a statement concerning the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. The Patriarchate renewed its commitment to granting autocephaly to the Church in Ukraine, and heard the appeals of Filaret (Denysenko) and Makariy (Maletych). These two bishops had been deposed by the Moscow Patriarchate and had appealed the judgments rendered against them to the Constantinopolitan throne. Constantinople heard their appeals and annulled the sanctions imposed against both bishops by the Moscow Patriarchate, restoring them and their faithful to communion with the rest of the Orthodox Church. The official position of the Moscow Patriarchate is that the sanctions imposed were justified on the basis of the canonical violations committed by the clergy. For their part, the accused and convicted clergy claimed that politics motivated their removals from holy orders, and are therefore unjust. Throughout the process of the implementation of Ukrainian autocephaly, one of the primary points of dispute among Orthodox theologians and Church leaders was the canonical justification for the annulment of the depositions of the two bishops. Recently, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew has responded to the question on this matter posed by Archbishop Anastasios of Tirana, with reference to canons 9 and 17 of the Council of Chalcedon (451), which grant the patriarch of Constantinople the privilege to hear and adjudicate disputes between bishops.1
While the Moscow Patriarchate has presented its dissenting opinion on the canonical basis for annulling canonical sanctions, the story of how these sanctions were imposed in the first place has been buried underneath the controversy surrounding the history of Filaret in particular.
The following section explores Moscow’s imposition of canonical sanctions on clergy who led the movement for autocephaly in Ukraine in three historical periods. This review demonstrates that the canons became instruments of power to remove dissenting voices on autocephaly from the Church in Ukraine and provide a decisive advantage for those favoring the status quo of Ukrainian subordination to the Moscow Patriarchate.
Case Study 1: Canonical Depositions in 1920-21
The canonical deposition of priests in the eparchy of Kyiv in 1920-21 is the first example of the conflict between Ukrainian supporters of autocephaly and the bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate.2
Originally, the primary objective of the autocephalists was the introduction of Ukrainian-language in church services such as the Divine Liturgy. The pre-conciliar liturgical commission preparing for the Moscow Council of 1917-18 prepared proposals for the translation of liturgical texts into Russian and Ukrainian. Ukrainian Orthodox had anticipated approval of the use of the vernacular, and were heartbroken when the Moscow Council did not approve these translations. The defeat of the proposal at the all-Ukrainian Council of 1918 stung even more, as reception of Ukrainian as a legitimate liturgical language was widely expected. The 1918 council permitted Ukrainian only for the reading of the Gospel on Pascha.3
The leaders of the Ukrainian autocephaly movement did not accept the dismissal of Ukrainian without a struggle. From the second half of the nineteenth century until the revolution, the Tsarist regime had intensified its efforts to promote Russian language throughout the empire, and had placed tight restrictions on Ukrainian-language publications. On the one hand, encouraging Russian language was part of a larger attempt to educate all the peoples of the empire; discouraging Ukrainian was aimed towards eradicating potential revolutionary threats to the imperial state. In this sense, these efforts cannot be reduced to Russian colonization of Ukraine. On the other hand, Ukrainian intellectuals received the ecclesial decisions of 1917-18 as the latest of a series of efforts to minimize the Ukrainian people by dismissing the legitimacy of their language. The pioneers of the autocephaly movement viewed the fall of the tsar as an opportunity to promote the Ukrainian language and restore the traditions of the Kyivan Metropolia before it came under Moscow’s jurisdiction in 1686. Only canonical autocephaly would create the conditions necessary for such a restoration, but a number of supporters of autocephaly were uni Ukrainian council to facilitate the bishops’ implementation of their agenda. For pro-autocephaly Ukrainians, this series of events confirmed their lack of trust in Moscow to honor the rules of conventional proceedings. The Ukrainians therefore turned from convention to subversion in their tactics, negotiating with the Soviet authorities independently of the bishops of the patriarchal exarchate in Ukraine to obtain use of parish communities for Ukrainian-language liturgies, a path that resulted in the official registration of Ukrainian parishes. After tolerating this for a short while, the Russian bishops in Ukraine responded forcefully, by suspending and deposing Ukrainian clergy who presided at such services without explicit episcopal blessings from the ranks of holy orders in 1920-21.
The bishops made these decisions from the canonical power they had over the lower clergy, and the result was twofold. First, these canonical depositions essentially excised Ukrainians from the Church who threatened the internal unity of the Moscow Patriarchate. Second, their removal from the ranks of the clergy delegitimized them –any and all activities involving suspended or deposed Ukrainian clergy from this point forward be illegitimate by definition, evidenced by a letter from the synod of patriarchal bishops in Ukraine addressing all Orthodox faithful and reminding them that “those who are deposed from orders and priests who are suspended from liturgical service are not permitted to perform any church services or sacraments, and that celebrating them does not yield any gracious power.”4
It is at this early point in the modern history of the Ukrainian Church that canonicity became a crucial feature of ecclesial identity. The question of who is and who is not canonical shapes the entire movement for Ukrainian autocephaly. The effect of the decisions of the Moscow Patriarchate revealed the power dynamics at play in the struggle between the Ukrainian clergy and the patriarchal bishops in Ukraine: by deposing all of the clergy who participated in Ukrainian-language services, the Moscow Patriarchate essentially eliminated pro-Ukrainian, pro-autocephaly members of the clergy who could otherwise wield influence in restoring momentum for obtaining canonical autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church.
It is at this early point in the modern history of the Ukrainian Church that canonicity became a crucial feature of ecclesial identity. The question of who is and who is not canonical shapes the entire movement for Ukrainian autocephaly. The effect of the decisions of the Moscow Patriarchate revealed the power dynamics at play in the struggle between the Ukrainian clergy and the patriarchal bishops in Ukraine: by deposing all of the clergy who participated in Ukrainian-language services, the Moscow Patriarchate essentially eliminated pro-Ukrainian, pro-autocephaly members of the clergy who could otherwise wield influence in restoring momentum for obtaining canonical autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church.
Case Study 2: Deposition of Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) Bishops in 1942
The next two case studies essentially follow this pattern of imposing canonical sanctions to eliminate opposition from within the Church. Our second example occurred during World War II, when Ukraine was under German occupation. Nazi cruelty was no less severe than the Soviet version, but it was different, and the Germans allowed the Ukrainians to resume Orthodox Church life. The opportunity to begin reconstruction of the Orthodox Church throughout Ukraine began in 1941. The problem was one of jurisdiction, because the occupied portions of Ukraine included those that had belonged to Poland. The Orthodox Church of Poland received autocephaly in 1924, and it had a significant Ukrainian population. The leaders of the Ukrainian Church disagreed on the proper canonical decisions to observe for restoring Church life. One cohort of bishops adopted autonomy under the Moscow Patriarchate as the most recent authoritative canonical status from the Moscow and Kyiv councils of 1918. Another cohort of bishops honored the tomos of autocephaly given to Poland as authoritative
–this tomos declared the 1686 transfer of Kyiv to Moscow as uncanonical. Metropolitan Dionisii of Warsaw approved the establishment of an autocephalous Church in Ukraine on the basis of the tomos given to Poland. He appointed Metropolitan Policarp (Sikorski) to act as the senior bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and Policarp began organizing Church life, which included the use of Ukrainian for the liturgy. The conflict between the two cohorts of bishops–autonomous and autocephalous - intensified, and eventually resulted in a response from Moscow. A series of events during the war complicated matters. First, the clergy of the 1921 UAOC who remained in Ukraine sought entry into the 1942 UAOC. As a canonical Church, the 1942 UAOC decided to receive these clergy as they were (в сущому сані, in their “true orders”), consistent with their ordinations from the 1921 church despite its canonical deficiencies.5
The 1942 UAOC composed a rite of return of priests from a different ordination as a method of receiving the 1921 clergy without re-ordaining them. The rite consists of prayers of absolution followed by the laying-on-of-hands and a prayer. The autonomous bishops rejected the canonicity of this rite and referred to this decision as a heretical act. The autonomists called for the canonical deposition of all clergy who joined the UAOC, concelebrated with it, and commemorated its bishops. The UAOC responded angrily, pointing out that the autonomists were the only Orthodox to describe the 1921 UAOC as heretical, and that the execution of many of their clergy resulted in the bloodshed of martyrs “that consecrated their order(s).” On March 28, 1942, the synod of the Moscow Patriarchate deposed Metropolitan Policarp and all of the UAOC bishops on March 28, 1942, for “leading the Church into schism.” Metropolitan Sergei accused Policarp of creating an alliance with the fascists and betraying the interests of the people. The justification for the decision of the Moscow Patriarchate was that Ukraine remained their canonical territory, even though the bishops of the UAOC traced their apostolic succession to the Church in Poland, not the Moscow Patriarchate. This event demonstrates another instance in the pattern originating in 1920. By canonically deposing the bishops of the UAOC in Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarchate again attempted to remove pro-autocephaly clergy from the Church. This particular action was accompanied by sharp political overtones, as Metropolitan Sergei’s polemical assault accused the autocephalist bishops of collaborating with the fascists and Nazis, adding another layer to an allegedly illegitimate identity.
The next two case studies essentially follow this pattern of imposing canonical sanctions to eliminate opposition from within the Church. Our second example occurred during World War II, when Ukraine was under German occupation. Nazi cruelty was no less severe than the Soviet version, but it was different, and the Germans allowed the Ukrainians to resume Orthodox Church life. The opportunity to begin reconstruction of the Orthodox Church throughout Ukraine began in 1941. The problem was one of jurisdiction, because the occupied portions of Ukraine included those that had belonged to Poland. The Orthodox Church of Poland received autocephaly in 1924, and it had a significant Ukrainian population. The leaders of the Ukrainian Church disagreed on the proper canonical decisions to observe for restoring Church life. One cohort of bishops adopted autonomy under the Moscow Patriarchate as the most recent authoritative canonical status from the Moscow and Kyiv councils of 1918. Another cohort of bishops honored the tomos of autocephaly given to Poland as authoritative
–this tomos declared the 1686 transfer of Kyiv to Moscow as uncanonical. Metropolitan Dionisii of Warsaw approved the establishment of an autocephalous Church in Ukraine on the basis of the tomos given to Poland. He appointed Metropolitan Policarp (Sikorski) to act as the senior bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, and Policarp began organizing Church life, which included the use of Ukrainian for the liturgy. The conflict between the two cohorts of bishops–autonomous and autocephalous - intensified, and eventually resulted in a response from Moscow. A series of events during the war complicated matters. First, the clergy of the 1921 UAOC who remained in Ukraine sought entry into the 1942 UAOC. As a canonical Church, the 1942 UAOC decided to receive these clergy as they were (в сущому сані, in their “true orders”), consistent with their ordinations from the 1921 church despite its canonical deficiencies.5
The 1942 UAOC composed a rite of return of priests from a different ordination as a method of receiving the 1921 clergy without re-ordaining them. The rite consists of prayers of absolution followed by the laying-on-of-hands and a prayer. The autonomous bishops rejected the canonicity of this rite and referred to this decision as a heretical act. The autonomists called for the canonical deposition of all clergy who joined the UAOC, concelebrated with it, and commemorated its bishops. The UAOC responded angrily, pointing out that the autonomists were the only Orthodox to describe the 1921 UAOC as heretical, and that the execution of many of their clergy resulted in the bloodshed of martyrs “that consecrated their order(s).” On March 28, 1942, the synod of the Moscow Patriarchate deposed Metropolitan Policarp and all of the UAOC bishops on March 28, 1942, for “leading the Church into schism.” Metropolitan Sergei accused Policarp of creating an alliance with the fascists and betraying the interests of the people. The justification for the decision of the Moscow Patriarchate was that Ukraine remained their canonical territory, even though the bishops of the UAOC traced their apostolic succession to the Church in Poland, not the Moscow Patriarchate. This event demonstrates another instance in the pattern originating in 1920. By canonically deposing the bishops of the UAOC in Ukraine, the Moscow Patriarchate again attempted to remove pro-autocephaly clergy from the Church. This particular action was accompanied by sharp political overtones, as Metropolitan Sergei’s polemical assault accused the autocephalist bishops of collaborating with the fascists and Nazis, adding another layer to an allegedly illegitimate identity.
Case Study 3: Deposition and Anathematization of Metropolitan Filaret (1992, 1997)
Our third and final case study is the one receiving all of the media attention, the deposition (1992) and anathematization (1997) of Filaret.6
When the Soviet government permitted the legal registration of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) in 1989, and the UAOC elevated its status to a patriarchate in 1990, the resurgence of the autocephalous movement in Ukraine unleashed a barrage of exchanges of blows between autocephalists and the Moscow Patriarchate that followed the pattern established in 1921, only with more intensity.
After the Moscow Patriarchate’s attempt to elevate the
stature of its Church in Ukraine by changing its canonical status
from exarchate to “broad autonomy,” Metropolitan Filaret
(patriarchal exarch to Ukraine) likely realized that the autocephalists were impervious to the usual strategy of polemical
dismissal as “uncanonical.” He galvanized his own episcopate –
some say with the cruel force of a dictator– to appeal to Moscow for autocephaly, twice–in November of 1991 and April of 1992. Moscow responded by accusing Filaret of leading the Church into schism and attempted to force him to retire. When Filaret refused after initially agreeing, his own bishops abandoned him by gathering in Kharkiv in May 1992 to elect a new primate. Moscow effectively excised Filaret from the Church by not only deposing him, but adopting the most brutal nuclear option of anathematization in 1997. The context surrounding the events of 1991-92 provide clarity on the situation unfolding in the Ukrainian Church. Filaret secured the signatures of all the bishops of the Church in Ukraine that formally appealed for autocephaly from Moscow. There is certainly evidence suggesting that Filaret used coercive tactics to secure signatures of reluctant bishops, such as reassigning bishops to undesirable eparchies as punishment for dissidence.7
Nevertheless, only three bishops ultimately withdrew their support for autocephaly in April of 1992, despite Filaret’s own abuse of canonical power in transferring bishops who refused to support his position.
The news of Moscow’s deposition of Filaret was dominated in the media by a series of accusations that he had violated his monastic vows by having a common-law wife and children. It was convenient that Moscow publicized Filaret’s violation of his monastic vows only when his struggle with the patriarchal synod in Moscow came to a head in April of 1992. He was charged with leading the Church into schism, and publicly depicted as a corrupt despot. In previous cases, Moscow accused the Ukrainians fighting
for autocephaly of Nazism and nationalistic tendencies. In Filaret’s
case, the news of his personal transgressions added weight to Moscow’s campaign against him. To this day, Filaret vehemently denies the charges against him. In 1992, then, Moscow perpetuated their pattern of simply removing the most formidable supporter of Ukrainian autocephaly through the imposition of canonical sanctions. Currently, the Moscow Patriarchate continues to use the threat of canonical interdict in the present situation. When two metropolitans of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP) participated in the unification council on December 15, 2018, the Moscow Patriarchate immediately suspended them, even though Patriarch Bartholomew had received both bishops under his omophorion on the previous day. Moscow imposed the same bans on clergy who left the UOC-MP for the Orthodox Church in Ukraine (OCU) after the unification council.8
Conclusions
Were the canonical depositions from holy orders imposed by Moscow on three generations of pro-autocephaly Ukrainian clergy justified canonically, or abuses of power? In these cases, both the judges and the suspects argue that their actions were justified. The primary problem revealed by this pattern is the collision between power and impartiality. The bishops of the Moscow Patriarchate had the power to impose sanctions, and in each stage of Ukrainian autocephaly, they exercised that power to simply remove the ordained leaders of the pro-autocephaly cohort in an attempt to dissolve the movement. The accused and convicted members of the clergy claimed that political conditions made an impartial hearing of their appeals impossible. When the accused and convicted claim that they cannot receive an impartial hearing from the Church that imposed the sanctions, the only solution is to invite a third pa to adjudicate the appeal. The history of the Ukrainian autocephalous movement is one of dozens of painful and polemical conflicts with the Moscow Patriarchate. In this environment, it would be unlikely for Moscow to consider a Ukrainian appeal impartially. Filaret and Makariy appealed to the Ecumenical Patriarchate as the first among the Orthodox Churches, knowing that the canons of the council of Chalcedon granted Constantinople the authority to adjudicate appeals. Dissenters might claim that Constantinople is misinterpreting these canons and that the ecumenical patriarch is not an impartial mediator, but to date, no one has identified an alternative mechanism for a third party appeals process grounded in the canonical tradition of the Church so that power is not abused by imposing canonical sanctions to silence dissident voices in the Church.
1.See Patriarch Bartholomew’s letter dated February 20, 2019, here:
https://www.patriarchate.org/-/letter-to-archbishop-of-albania-2019-01-14. For the early history of the application of canons 9 and 17 from the council of Chalcedon, see Brian Daley, SJ, “The Meaning and Exercise of ‘Primacies of Honor’ in the Early Church,” in Primacy in the Church, vol. 1:The Office of Primate and the Authority of Councils
, ed. John Chryssavgis (Crestwood, NY: St.Vladimir’s Press, 2016), 46-7.
2. Examples taken from Nicholas Denysenko, The Orthodox Church in Ukraine: A Century of Separation (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2018).
3. This prohibition was eased during a meeting of the patriarchal synod in Ukraine in 1921 – they decided to allow a Ukrainian Gospel after the Slavonic one, along with a homily and Ukrainian pronunciation of Slavonic for all liturgical services.
4. Cited in Denysenko, 31.
5. For a complete account, see ibid., 79-83.
6. For a complete account, see ibid., 170-81.
7. Ibid., 173.
8. In one case, a bishop suspended the priest and declared that the bread and cup
offered at the Divine Liturgy would not become the Lord’s body and
blood if the priest presided at Liturgy in spite of the suspension