Dareg Zabarah , Acta Slavica Iaponica, Tomus 33, pp. 47‒65
The influence of the Orthodox churches on state and nation building processes in post-1989 Europe remains an important research topic which is still
under theorized.1
Especially after the collapse of the Communist regimes, the
increased role of the Orthodox churches in shaping the polity of the new national states has moved from the realm of the private into the political and
should thus not only concern theological researchers but also historians and
political scientists.
Both, political elites in a state polity as well as church elites in Orthodoxy
are bound by peculiar institutional heritages. Although these institutionalized
heritages may vary to a certain extent, due to the different laws these groups
are subject to (priests are bound to canonical law, while politicians are not),
common institutional heritages are often overlooked. Although churches are
no longer subject to direct government orders from above, the socialization of
church elites and the support they receive from the political hierarchy matter.
These interactions shape the political and church hierarchy in a dialectic way
and thus Orthodox thought.
There is often a tendency to treat the Orthodox Church as a single and
unanimous actor. Matsuzato argues that due to the fact that the Orthodox
Church is regulated by the seven Ecumenical Councils (fourth to eighth centuries A. D.), “Orthodox politics are supra-national and relatively independent
from secular politics; thus, the widespread understanding of Orthodoxy as a
caesaropapist religion should be questioned.”2
Matsuzato is correct that formal
church regulations are largely unified among the mutually recognized churches. However, interpretations of these regulations often differ so widely that
any assumptions about the overarching unity of the church prove problematic.
Differences among the Orthodox churches are so huge that it is hard to speak...
continue