By: Vasilios Makrides, berkleycenter
December 14, 2018
What is actually at stake in the unfolding Ukrainian
Church crisis? The Orthodox actors involved draw on a variety of
arguments from theology, canon law, and church history. Outside
observers look at the sociopolitical dimensions of the conflict. It is
about interesting discourses shedding light on this multidimensional
crisis. Other perspectives, however, including those from institutional
analysis, offer further useful insights.
The Orthodox churches are religious institutions
relating to each other, as well as to other religious or secular
institutions in their specific area of dominance (the so-called
“canonical territory”) and internationally. Smooth inter-Orthodox
relations presuppose a valid, binding, and generally accepted frame of
reference and exact coordinates, in which these churches are expected to
operate. However, this is exactly what is still missing in the overall
Orthodox world of the currently 14 autocephalous churches. The
Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople is considered as the “leader” of
this world, yet his pan-Orthodox functions and their concrete enactment
are often contested. He claims, for instance, to have the exclusive
right to grant autocephaly to a new church, and this is—historically
speaking—true to a large extent. Yet, exactly this claim has been
strongly contested, especially by the Moscow Patriarchate, on other
considerations. Consequently, there is no pan-Orthodox unanimity on this
issue, a fact complicating the relations between these two major
Orthodox players, who possess additionally great geopolitical
relevance.
Broadly speaking, it is about a power struggle between
Constantinople and Moscow that has been going on in various forms since
the second half of the nineteenth century and revolves around the
central question of primacy. The past speaks rather in favor of
Constantinople, yet the Moscow Patriarchate has hardly been an
insignificant player in recent history. It is also the numerically
biggest Orthodox church today. Even if weakened under Soviet rule, it
has emerged in the post-communist period as a powerful domestic and
global actor and is part and parcel of Russia’s current soft power
international strategy.
One major incident in the continuing
struggle between these two institutions has been the Pan-Orthodox
Council of 2016 in Crete, which the Moscow Patriarchate tried
unsuccessfully to boycott or postpone in various ways. It is commonly
assumed that it was behind the last-minute withdrawal of the three other
churches from the council. If this long-awaited council would have
taken place under the leadership of Constantinople and with all Orthodox
churches participating, it would certainly bestow a huge advantage,
both symbolically and pragmatically, on this religious institution by
enhancing further its primacy claims and legitimacy within the entire
Orthodox body. Such a development was highly undesirable for the Russian
side and its analogous claims. A closer analysis of the semiotics of
the Moscow Patriarchate’s actions, before and after the council, reveals
a constant policy of undermining Constantinople’s authority and
steadily deploying and augmenting its own prerogatives. This can be
often discerned in the dropping of the title “Ecumenical” when
addressing the Patriarch of Constantinople; or in the meeting between
Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill in Cuba in February 2016; or further
through Moscow’s constant and meticulous mediatization in the presence
of Russian political authorities or Orthodox church leaders.
In
such a constellation, the religious institution under challenge
(Constantinople) may take serious and open action against its potential
contender (Moscow). A direct confrontation with the latter could not
only clear the whole picture, but also enhance further the leading role
of Constantinople. It would also send a message about who possesses
pan-Orthodox power. Seen in this way, Constantinople aptly used the
overall political crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations and chose to
intervene in an area that badly hurt the Russian side, namely Ukraine.
This was not a peripheral question, such as their dispute in Estonia
back in 1996, but a key issue to which Moscow was always extremely
sensitive. Institutionally speaking, Moscow had no other option than to
completely break its relations with Constantinople. Any other decision
would signify its clear defeat. Interestingly enough, Metropolitan
Hilarion stated that Constantinople, due to its actions, cannot be
considered any longer the leader of the Orthodox world. It becomes
obvious then what it is all about in this crisis.
The conflict
has just started and, given the pros and cons of both sides, it will be a
long one with an open outcome. Whether one of the two sides wins, or a
compromise will eventually be reached, remains to be seen.