The Ukrainian Church may have won a battle, but not the war
With the official
enthronement ceremony on 3 February 2019, Metropolitan Epiphanius
became the new Primate of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This marked
the end of the process of establishing the autocephalous Ukrainian
Orthodox Church. Anyone who has kept an eye on Ukraine will already know
that, in addition to organising the country’s religious landscape, the
declaration of the autocephaly of the local church serves a political
purpose. This is primarily expressed in the relationship with Russia and
the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), but it also has a broader
geopolitical impact, which involves the use of the Orthodox Church as an
instrument of Russian foreign policy and the rearrangement of the
global balance of power. The shift of power relations in the Orthodox
Church has just begun as a result of events in Ukraine, but it has
already managed to usher in a new era for the church’s 300 million or so
members, which is characterised by a clearer split between the churches
and non-compliance with church law. Aside from the Orthodox world,
attention must be paid to possible scenarios discussed by the ROC and
authorities to compensate for the loss flowing from the establishment of
the Ukrainian Church. The following explores both these topics.
Timeline of the Declaration of the Ukrainian Church’s Autocephaly
Since 2016, when the Ukrainian parliament asked the Ecumenical
Patriarchate of Constantinople to grant autocephaly for the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, the majority of Ukrainian adherents have moved firmly
towards ecclesiastical independence. In April 2018, the parliament’s
proposal was repeated by the Ukrainian president, Petro Poroshenko, who
took it to Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople in
Istanbul. For the members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, this was one
of several attempts to secede from the ROC during the past century.
This time they were finally successful.
The process of granting autocephaly in 2018 progressed gradually,
according to a strict procedure. In early September, Patriarch
Bartholomew despatched two exarchs to Ukraine to prepare for the
separation. The break came on 11 October, when the Holy Synod of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople confirmed that the process of granting
autocephaly was moving forward and the Patriarchate decided to take
further steps to this end. First, it decided to create a local
ecclesiastical structure in Kyiv, which would be directly subject to the
Patriarch of Constantinople, so that the head of the church would have
the right to operate in Ukraine; second, it was decided to restore the
rights of the heads of Ukraine’s two churches as Church officials and
the communion of their church with the rest of the Orthodox world.
Previously, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate
(UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which between
them accounted for over half of Ukrainian adherents, had been excluded
from the communion of other Orthodox churches. This meant that the rest
of the Orthodox world did not acknowledge these churches or their
leaders, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which was subject to the
Patriarchate of Moscow, was acknowledged as a church in Ukraine. The
Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople also decided to annul
the decision of 1686 that granted the ROC the right to ordain the
Metropolitan of Kyiv. The wish to nullify this centuries-old decision
was touched upon by both the representatives of the Ukrainian parliament
and president Petro Poroshenko when addressing the patriarch. Finally,
the Patriarchate of Constantinople called on all the parties to refrain
from the seizure of churches and monasteries and violence.
Even though the Synod had not yet officially established the new
Ukrainian Church, it took a decisive step towards the ecclesiastical
suppression of the ROC in Ukraine, which the Ukrainian president
interpreted as the immediate grant of autocephaly. That same evening,
Poroshenko appeared on television and described this step as a historic
victory of good over evil and light over darkness, emphasising that this
was important not only for religious life but also from the perspective
of national security and geopolitics. On 20 September, Poroshenko had
referred to it in parliament as Ukraine’s declaration of independence.
Poroshenko’s statements contained a grain of truth—otherwise these would
not have been followed by the ROC’s decision to break communion with
the Patriarchate of Constantinople and launch an extensive information
campaign against Ukraine. This reaction was expected, because the ROC
had reacted similarly to earlier clashes.
On 3 November, president Poroshenko visited Turkey, where he and
Patriarch Bartholomew signed an agreement to move peacefully towards
autocephaly and avoid ecclesiastical schisms. Bartholomew said that this
facilitated the issue of the official document granting autocephaly
(the tomos). This decision was to reassure all parties that the
matter was proceeding peacefully, but also the Russian authorities, who
reacted to the actions of the Patriarchate of Constantinople by saying
that they were ready to protect Russian Orthodox Christians in Ukraine
from possible violence and seizure of churches.
The Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople convened on
27–29 November, prior to which the Patriarchate issued a statement (on
19 November) confirming once again that the Ukrainian Church would
become independent and noting that the Synod would soon announce the
date for the Unification Council of the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine, to
be held in December. The Synod also reviewed the draft statutes of the
Church that was to be established.
In the end, the establishment of the new Church was finalised at a
Unification Council on 15 December in Kyiv and the Church elected a
metropolitan as its primate. The Church would not get a Patriarch as its
chief shepherd at first, even though this could not be excluded in the
future. The young Primate, Epiphanius (Serhii Dumenko), who recently
celebrated his 40th birthday, was not known to the wider public but, as
the former right-hand man to Filaret, head of the UOC-KP, he already has
experience in church matters.
Upon his enthronement as the head of the Church, he confirmed that
the new Ukrainian Church hoped to include all the Orthodox congregations
active in Ukraine in the future. The two churches (the UOC-KP and the
Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church) on which the new Church was
formed had hitherto been unacknowledged. Initially, the newly
established Church was joined by about 100 congregations of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). This
number has now grown to nearly 200. However, this is still marginal when
compared to the size of the UOC-MP, whose network of 12,000
congregations makes it Ukraine’s largest religious organisation.
However, the number of members tells another story because, despite the
large network of congregations, the UOC-MP is not the largest Orthodox
church and its membership has decreased significantly following Russia’s
aggression.
On 6 January 2019, Patriarch Bartholomew handed over the Church’s decree (tomos)
of autocephaly to Epiphanius in Constantinople, which was followed by
his enthronement as the head of the Church in early February.
Actions and Omissions of the Russian Orthodox Church
The Russian authorities’ reaction to developments in Ukraine was
blunt. Russia’s ruling elite, including president Vladimir Putin,
discussed the situation that had unfolded in 2018 at the Russian
Security Council on 13 October, and foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has
since repeated the mantra that the United States was behind everything.
Nevertheless, the Russian authorities did not go significantly beyond
this in their public statements at the end of 2018. They declared quite
firmly that the state had no authority to intervene in ecclesiastical
matters. However, they continued to work behind the scenes. Their
powerlessness and anger was also evident from the fact that, in addition
to destabilising Ukraine, the aggression in the Kerch Strait was also
intended to intimidate the Patriarchate of Constantinople, because
nobody would declare ecclesiastical independence in a country brought to
the brink of war. But autocephality was nevertheless announced.
The claim about the separation of Church and state and the
authorities refraining from interfering in church matters is ironic not
only in the context of Russia because of the close relationship between
the Orthodox Church and the Russian authorities, but also in the context
of religious freedom in Russia itself. In recent years, the Russian
authorities have been persistently pushing towards restricting religious
freedom. The 2017 decision to categorise Jehovah’s Witnesses as
extremists has received the most attention. The authorities’ actions not
only been on the statutory level; they have been followed by campaigns
against Jehovah’s Witnesses. For instance, in early October, five
Jehovah’s Witnesses were detained and accused of organising the
collection of funds, distributing literature illegal in the eyes of the
law, and conducting services. The fight against Jehovah’s Witnesses was
brought to a whole new level when two hand grenades and one landmine
were found during a search. It appears that the authorities believe such
items to be part of extremists’ standard equipment, because this makes
it easier for them to convince the public of Jehovah’s Witnesses being a
dangerous religious community. In the past, Jehovah’s Witnesses have
filmed FSB officials ransacking their places of worship and FSB agents
planting items just to “discover” them a moment later.
On 6 February 2019, the Russian judiciary reached the first milestone
in the fight against Jehovah’s Witnesses when it sentenced a Danish
adherent to six years in prison because he had participated in the
organisation’s founding, which the court considered an extremist
activity. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov responded to Western protests
by saying that the question would be considered further, but it is
unlikely that this will result in the introduction of any mitigating
measures.
Following the ROC’s break of communion with the Patriarchate of
Constantinople on 15 October, the Russian Church and authorities
launched a propaganda attack against Patriarch Bartholomew. The UOC-MP
declared that it did not acknowledge the decisions of the Patriarchate
of Constantinople and would not participate in the establishment of the
new church. In many ways, the criticism of the establishment of the
Ukrainian Church has been aimed at the person of the Ecumenical
Patriarch of Constantinople, which is understandable from the ROC’s
perspective, but quite unwise in strategic terms. The influence of the
Ecumenical Patriarch in the Orthodox world is so unique and symbolic of
the historical unity of the church that any attack against him is an
attack on the integrity of the Orthodox Church itself. Consequently, the
rest of the Orthodox world has not gone along with this criticism, even
though complaints about the behaviour of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople can be heard from the heads of several churches. It seems
that Patriarch Kirill of Moscow believes that he can do nothing but try
to isolate Bartholomew from other Orthodox churches, and to this end
the Russian authorities have deployed their full arsenal, with false
allegations about Bartholomew receiving large bribes from Ukraine
receiving the most attention.
The Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia, and the Church
of Poland—which are both independent but have traditionally been under
Moscow’s influence—were quick to express their solidarity with the ROC.
The Serbian Orthodox Church, which is also close to the ROC, decided at a
meeting of bishops on 6–7 November that it did not intend to
acknowledge the decision of the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople
to rehabilitate the heads of the two hitherto unacknowledged churches in
Ukraine as canonical and would continue to regard their clergy and
followers as schismatic and therefore not in communion with them.
On 23 November, Hilarion, the ROC’s head of External Church
Relations, stated that it had become clear that the unification of the
Ukrainian Church was not possible and claimed that the initiatives of
the secular power could not be good for the Church. This was a standard
deterrence on Russia’s part in order to derail the efforts of Ukrainian
Orthodox Christians and president Poroshenko. Russia depicts the
creation of the new church as a political project that has nothing to do
with the actual needs of the Orthodox Church. The same rhetoric was
used in the quarrel over the Estonian Orthodox Church in the 1990s.
In response to the ROC’s actions, Ukrainian clergy have drawn
attention to Moscow’s long-term omissions in ensuring the resolution of
the Ukrainian Church question. Moscow in turn usually blames Filaret,
the stubborn head of the UOC-KP, who was in the running for the position
of Patriarch of Moscow in 1990 but lost and was later expelled from the
ROC. This has not put an end to the Ukrainian clergy’s anti-ROC
statements.
In the last 15 years, criticism has become more pronounced and, over
time, the achievement of religious unity and the wish to operate as an
independent church have been supplemented with a number of other topics:
the security aspect, the increasingly clear expression of Russia’s
imperialist ambitions and the cultivation of the Russian World (Russki Mir).
Like the Ukrainian clergy, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of
Constantinople draws attention to the fact that the ROC has had the
opportunity to resolve the generational schism between Orthodox churches
for several decades, but still has not managed to do so. Instead, the
ROC has tried to prevent the establishment of an autocephalous Ukrainian
Church and promoted brotherhood between the two nations and operation
as one Russian Orthodox Church. Ukraine is naturally important to the
ROC because of its history and the desire to maintain its scope, and it
has therefore not followed the scenario applied in Ukraine to the Church
of Poland or the Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia. This, however,
has created a situation in the Orthodox Church that is completely
unacceptable from the point of view of church law, where nearly half of
Ukrainian Orthodox Christians were denied communion with the Orthodox
Church for decades. Even if this seems unimportant at first because all
churches are big enough to operate independently, it is still a
considerable shortcoming for the Patriarchate of Constantinople given
the Orthodox world order, which has prompted it to resolve this
question.
Russia managed to keep the conflict over the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church frozen for a long time, and what we have witnessed in the past
few years is a first and unexpected response from the ROC and Russian
authorities on how the conflict is to be thawed out and the consequences
of this. This naturally makes one wonder: if such a scenario can be
applied in the case of a frozen conflict, why not use it to resolve
other disputes? However, this is a dangerous idea for Russia, because
both the Orthodox Church and the Russian state have a long list of such
conflicts. At the same time, the ROC’s behaviour over decades vividly
illustrates that it sees the question of the Ukrainian Church as a
political issue; otherwise, it would have immediately tried to solve it
somehow according to Orthodox canon. Ecclesiastical unity, which is
always stressed in the statements of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, is an
underlying standard for the Orthodox order. The Ukrainian Church was
also created with the aim to unite different groups. This naturally
involves a fair amount of politics, and president Poroshenko does not
deny it being one of the greatest or even the greatest achievement of
his tenure; but for the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the politically
favourable situation only matters to the extent that it helps to end the
uncanonical situation that has long troubled the Orthodox Church.
The inability of the ROC to solve the inter-church conflict is made
more noteworthy by the fact that the topics concerning the Orthodox
Church have long been a question of Ukrainians’ religious identity,
self-worth and history, but it only became a security issue for the
Ukrainian authorities after Russia’s aggression and the annexation of
Crimea. Since the ROC became one of the symbols of Russian aggression in
the context of this dispute, it was only natural that the Ukrainian
authorities began to take steps to declare the Church’s independence.
This has also certainly increased the Orthodox community of the
Patriarchate of Kyiv, while having the opposite effect on the membership
of the UOC-MP.
For decades, there have also been voices in the UOC-MP demanding the
declaration of autocephaly. The reason given for this was that the
independent Orthodox Church, which acknowledges a shared history with
Russia, is friendly towards the ROC and smooth cooperation between the
two churches is possible. The moment for this has, of course, now
passed.
Despite this, in November 2018 president Poroshenko also tried to
meet representatives of the UOC-MP. Poroshenko was himself a member of
this church, whereas Simeon, the Metropolitan of Vinnitsa and Bar and
the spiritual father of the president and the prime minister, was the
only one of the 83 bishops who refused to sign up to the UOC-MP’s
decision to condemn Constantinople’s actions. He has now joined the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, but he is currently arguing in court over his
right to remain the ruling bishop in his eparchy. The president’s
proposed meeting with representatives of the UOC-MP was cancelled for a
rather unusual reason: the Church representatives asked that the meeting
be held on the territory of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra monastery, which
belongs to the Church. Poroshenko, however, invited them to Ukrainian
House, the International Convention Centre in Kyiv, designed for large
gatherings. Even though no official meeting took place in the end, fewer
than ten representatives of the clergy met Poroshenko at Ukrainian
House.
This incident would have been brushed off as a one-off amusing
miscommunication if such childish games were not part of the ROC’s modus
operandi. There have been cases of ROC clergymen refusing to go to a
meeting and looking for any trifling excuse to present to the other
party as a compelling reason for not meeting sincerely and conveniently.
This time the issue was apparent confusion over the meeting venue while
the actual reason lay in the calls by bishops supporting the
autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. Most clergymen of the UOC-MP did
not subscribe to such positions, but the bishops’ readiness to join the
autocephalous church had increased and even the slightest peep would
have given any observer the chance to say that the UOC-MP was not really
unified. The situation around defectors is to remain anxious and
sensitive for a while, because the new Ukrainian Orthodox Church is
expected to grow at the expense of the UOC-MP.
The ROC’s pattern of behaviour is also aptly characterised by the
Church’s withdrawal from participation in the Pan-Orthodox Council in
2016. This meeting had been in the works for some 50 years and was
historic solely for the fact that there had not been a meeting of all
Orthodox churches on such a scale for more than a thousand years. Since
then, the number of churches had multiplied and the world had changed
dramatically. The council convened in Istanbul, and responsibility for
it lay with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople as the unifier
of the churches. Even though this special right had been a thorn in
Moscow’s side, the ROC had been given permission to participate in the
synod as a result of consultations lasting for years. To this end,
Constantinople made a fair number of concessions, including a
last-minute change of location of the synod from Istanbul to Crete,
because relations between Turkey and Russia were at a low point at the
time. In the end, the ROC did not participate in the meeting, claiming
that the council did not have the authority to speak for the Orthodox
Church due to the absence of three churches. However, ten churches took
part. While two churches did not take part for doctrinal reasons and one
more due to a quarrel between themselves, the ROC did not participate
because of its wish to endanger the position of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate of Constantinople as the unifier of churches.
The Ukraine Conflict and the Future of the Orthodox Church
Prior to the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople in late
November 2018, Hilarion (the ROC’s head of external church relations)
began a tour of other Orthodox churches in order to seek support for the
Russian Church’s position to prevent the Ukrainian Church from gaining
autocephaly. Besides threats directed at Ukraine and Constantinople,
Moscow used softer methods to create a united front against the
Ecumenical Patriarchate. After the first steps taken by Bartholomew in
the spring of 2018, it appeared that some churches were trying to align
themselves with Moscow but, by the end of the year, these positions were
replaced by calls for an internal dialogue. The Patriarchate of
Constantinople ignored Moscow’s behaviour and continued with its steps,
which culminated in the granting of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church.
However, Patriarch Bartholomew has not remained completely silent about
Moscow’s steps, and the Church of Constantinople has reminded Russia
that it was the one to break communion between Constantinople and
Moscow, not the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The latter has not gone along
with the schism and the Orthodox world is therefore currently confused
about who is in communion with whom.
The ROC’s actions are reminiscent of the attempt following World War
II to take charge of the Orthodox world in order to make Moscow the
“Vatican” of the Orthodox Church. To this end, Patriarch Alexy of Moscow
went on a journey authorised by Stalin to the three old
patriarchates—Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem—in order to convince
them to move the centre of the Orthodox Church from the Patriarchate of
Constantinople in Istanbul to Moscow. His argument was power: the ROC
could restore the Orthodox Church, which had weakened in the Middle East
and Turkey, to its former glory. Naturally, this was also intended to
serve the Soviet Union’s foreign-policy ambitions. The plan ultimately
fell through, but the understanding that the strength and power arising
from the size of the Church could serve as an instrument for striving
for a more important position in the Orthodox Church has remained
inherent to the ROC.
This is also the reason that the Patriarchate of Constantinople—which
does not usually comment on the political aspects of the matter and
talks about the ecclesiastical rights of the Orthodox Church—spoke out
at the end of the year and accused the ROC of politicising the question
and pursuing imperialist ambitions. The Ecumenical Patriarchate itself
emphasises that it is apolitical, because it has not had to follow any
heads of state like the ROC has done and continues to do. Constantinople
also reminds Russia that the latter was granted autocephaly from
Constantinople just like all the other churches. By questioning the
grant of autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church, it actually also questions
its own independence, because it gained this from the same place as the
Ukrainian Church. The ROC has, in turn, claimed that the schism with
which it is threatening the entire Orthodox Church will reduce the
Church by half and thus weaken it. This also constitutes Moscow’s
greatest failure, given that the power and size of the Orthodox Church
allow it to discard or change historical and current power
relationships. This does not, however, mean that the ROC is not trying
hard to do this.
The behaviour of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople in
dealing with the frozen conflict over Ukraine begins a new chapter in
resolving the general mess in the whole of the Orthodox Church: the
question of what is the Orthodox Church order, i.e. what authority does
the Patriarchate of Constantinople have to lead the Church globally. Are
all 14 independent Orthodox churches ready to acknowledge the
Patriarchate of Constantinople as the leading Church in the Orthodox
world to resolve their quarrels and stabilise the Orthodox Church order?
Since the 19th century, when the number of autocephalous churches
doubled, the Orthodox Church has become increasingly isolated.
National borders usually overlap with church boundaries and this has
had a considerable effect on the integrity of the Orthodox Church: all
the churches operate independently. Due to the problem over borders,
political changes have also affected the stability of Orthodox churches
and their boundaries. Consequently, there are many border disputes
between independent churches. The Patriarchate of Constantinople has had
a long and dignified history of mediating and resolving these disputes
throughout the history of the Orthodox Church, but the fragmentation
into separate islands in the great sea of the Orthodox faith has led to a
situation in which the Patriarchate of Constantinople performed its
historical obligation only a few times in the course of the 20th
century. Most of the time, the centuries-long church order has simply
been ignored. Admittedly, the Patriarchate of Constantinople has not
always looked favourably upon new church structures, and quite a few
Orthodox communities have already been disappointed in the behaviour of
the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
The so-called Orthodox diaspora causes problems, too. Since the one
global Orthodox Church consists of regional churches, the
diaspora—ecclesiastic structures outside the Church’s territory—actually
have no place in it. Ideally, one region should have only one church.
The reality, however, is quite different: outside their territory,
different churches (for instance in the US and Asia) have, in the course
of the 20th century, become rivals. In this situation it is crucial to
have someone to resolve such questions in order to ensure the integrity
of the Church.
The 2016 Pan-Orthodox Council was called for this exact purpose, but
several of the most debated questions, such as the granting of
autocephaly, were left out at the final stages of preparations, because
the churches could not agree. However, the representatives of several
churches have now said that the question of Ukraine should be discussed
again at the Council. The Patriarchate of Constantinople, however, has
begun to secure the ecclesiastical authority with renewed boldness and
said that the right time for discussion was two years ago. Now it is
time to act and this can only be done by relying on centuries-old
practice, according to which the autocephaly of churches is granted by
the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Church Council has not granted autocephaly
to any church—this has always been done by the Church of
Constantinople. The ROC has also granted autocephaly to several
churches, but these have either been nullified by the Patriarch of
Constantinople or replaced by their own declaration of autocephaly (the
churches of Poland and of the Czech Lands and Slovakia) or failed to be
universally acknowledged by the Patriarch of Constantinople and the rest
of the Orthodox world (e.g. the Orthodox Church in America).
A Bipolar Orthodox World
As far as the Ukraine conflict and the unity of the Orthodox Church
are concerned, the ROC has expressed readiness to act independently if
necessary. The activities of the Orthodox Church are already affecting
relationships with other Christian churches with whom the ROC is trying
to maintain direct contact. Following the break of communion with
Constantinople, Metropolitan Hilarion rushed to a meeting of Catholic
bishops, where the good relations between the ROC and the Roman Catholic
Church were confirmed. In November, this was followed by the ROC’s
decision to suspend its participation in the Ecumenical Council of the
Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches led by the Patriarchate of
Constantinople. On 28 November, Patriarch Bartholomew met the delegation
led by Roman Catholic Cardinal Kurt Koch in Istanbul, where they
confirmed the continuation of their cooperation.
Thus, on the one hand, the question of the Ukrainian Church had
generated new hope that the Patriarchate of Constantinople would be able
to ensure the unity of the Church in favourable political conditions
and achieve results. But on the other hand, this is cemented in the
long-established bipolar Orthodox world with Moscow’s friends (the
churches of Serbia, Antioch, Poland and the Czech Lands and Slovakia) on
one side and the rest of the Orthodox world on the other. In addition
to the usual spheres of influence with the so-called Greek Orthodox
community on one side and the Orthodox community of the Slavic tradition
on the other, the Orthodox world features a number of churches with
their own interests that established their position on the question of
Ukraine in this light. For instance, the Georgian Church has been slow
to acknowledge the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, even though
Ukraine expected Georgia to give it the first vote of support, because
the two countries have both stood up to Russian aggression for years.
The reason for the Georgian Church’s timidity, however, lies in the
regions that have fallen under Russian influence, which have since
remained under the Georgian Church and which that Church is afraid of
losing if it declares support for Ukraine. At the same time, in early
February, 30 Georgian theologians declared that they welcomed the birth
of the Ukrainian Church and hoped that the churches of Georgia and
Ukraine would soon be in communion with each other. The Romanian Church
has stood behind Constantinople, like the Bulgarian Church, which has
been dominated by supporters of the new Ukrainian Church after an
earlier schism. Even though both churches have had close ties with the
ROC, they also have a bone to pick with Moscow and this has pushed them
into supporting the Ukrainian Church.
Moscow’s rhetoric has mainly touched upon two topics. The first is
that it talks about the persecution of adherents to the Russian Church
in Ukraine, severely criticises the new Ukrainian Church, and condemns
every bishop and cleric who joins the Ukrainian Church. Special effort
is devoted to attacking the new Bishop, Epiphanius, by spreading rumours
about him being the son or grandson of Filaret, the former head of the
UOC-KP, and having illegitimate children of his own. This is Russia’s
attempt to reaffirm that the Church’s power will in fact remain in the
hands of the 90-year-old Filaret and that behind the new name lies the
old UOC-KP, which has not been acknowledged as a church by the Orthodox
world. It is true that, despite the title of national hero being given
to him by president Poroshenko—which gave reason to suspect that Filaret
would quietly be sent away—he has not gone anywhere and still shapes
Ukrainian religious life.
In a recent interview, Epiphanius stressed that it was understandable
that some congregations remained under the influence and structure of
Moscow but could not operate as churches. However, in December Ukraine’s
parliament passed a resolution according to which Moscow’s church
structure must clearly specify its subordinate relationship in the title
of the organisation. This means that there can only be one church in
Ukraine. Moscow’s presence naturally gives it the opportunity to
continue using the Orthodox faith to unite the “Russian World” and thus
nothing has yet been decided on Ukraine’s religious landscape. Even
though the ROC and Russian authorities lost a battle, they have not yet
lost the war. This means that the process of building the independent
Ukrainian Church entails all kinds of difficulties caused by Russia’s
continuous counteractions.
Russia’s second objective is to strengthen the relationship with its
friends, as is customary on the political level, in order to use them to
influence the rest of the Orthodox world. The ROC’s enemies in the
Orthodox world tend to be friends of Moscow’s friends. Vladimir Putin’s
recent [17 January] visit to Serbia and his transformation into
bricklayer at the church erected in honour of Saint Sava is the latest
vivid example of this pattern of behaviour. On the occasion of his 10th
year in office, Patriarch Kirill met the head of the Serbian Church in
Moscow, where the latter thanked the Russian Church for supporting the
Serbian Church’s fight for the lands of Kosovo and stated that the
Ukraine situation needed to be resolved by the Church Council. The head
of the Church of Antioch expressed the same opinion.
Similarly, the ROC’s rhetoric has come to include frequent talk of
filling the world with Moscow’s congregations due to the behaviour of
the Patriarchate of Constantinople. There was recently talk of a Russian
Orthodox mission to Thailand. This was explained by the need to create a
parallel structure to the Church of Constantinople, because the two
churches are not in communion. This is worth taking seriously, but one
must not forget that the ROC has actually operated on this principle
since the 19th century, establishing congregations and ecclesiastical
structures all over the world. Now it is simply being made public that
it intends to ignore the Orthodox Church order. The ROC says it has
branched out in 10 countries over the past decade.
The crusades and church-related demonstrations and disputes in
Ukraine are likely to continue in the near future and things may become
particularly acute when property questions are brought into play. The
Russian media are already preparing to add fuel to this topic. Just as
in the case of the Estonian Orthodox dispute in the 1990s, the question
of the Ukrainian Church is likely to end up on the agendas of meetings
at international organisations, in which Moscow will try to show that
members of the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine are being attacked.
The autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church is therefore likely to remain in
the public eye for quite some time.