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Andrew Sorokowski
…the
Kyivan patriarchate envisioned in the 1620s was conceived as a joint
Uniate-Orthodox entity, remaining in communion with both Rome and
Constantinople. Forces on both sides sank this ambitious dream. Could it
be revived today?
Last year the Vatican Nuncio in Kyiv,
Archbishop Claudio Gugerotti, predicted a “surprise for Ukraine.” That
surprise may be revealed at a meeting in Rome this coming 5-6 July
between Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC) Major Archbishop
Sviatoslav (Shevchuk) with his Permanent Synod and metropolitans on the
one hand, and Pope Francis, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin,
Prefect of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches Cardinal Leonardo
Sandri, President of the Pontifical Council for the Promotion of
Christian Unity Cardinal Kurt Koch, and Prefect of the Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith Cardinal Luis Ladaria on the other.
What issues could lie on the agenda of a
meeting between the UGCC hierarchy, the Pope, and the Vatican officials
responsible for foreign relations, the Eastern Catholic Churches,
ecumenism, and doctrine? In view of the latter two areas of
responsibility, Orthodox relations seem likely to come up.
In a recent article, Andrea Gagliarducci
mentions three “dreams” of the Greek-Catholics that might be discussed
at this meeting (“Papa Francesco e Chiesa Greco Cattolica Ucraina,
personaggi e teme del prossimo incontro,” Aci Stampa, 20 May 2019).
These are a UGCC patriarchate, the beatification of Metropolitan Andrei
Sheptytsky, and a papal visit to Ukraine.
A visit by Pope Francis to Ukraine could
follow the settlement of the other issues. The Sheptytsky beatification
would complete a decades-long process, though it might still require
overcoming resistance from Polish quarters. A Greek-Catholic
patriarchate would similarly crown persistent efforts undertaken by
Major Archbishop Josyf Cardinal Slipyj (1892-1984) after his arrival
from the Soviet Gulag in Rome in 1963 and continued by his successors.
It is here, however, that Orthodox
concerns appear. Josyf Slipyj’s struggle against the resistance of
Vatican diplomats and ecumenists deferring to Russian Orthodox
objections to his requests is well known. Moscow’s opposition was
motivated by both political and ecclesiological considerations -- the
inadmissibility of a Ukrainian “Uniate” church formally based on Soviet
territory, which in religious matters the state had reserved for the
Russian Orthodox Church, and the prohibition of a rival patriarchate on
the “canonical territory” of the Patriarchate of Moscow. Even when the
Roman canonists’ objections had been overcome with the legalization of
the UGCC on its home territory in 1989 and the completion of its
internal structure (a permanent synod and a patriarchal curia), Russian
Orthodox disapproval apparently remained influential. Thus, despite the
“maturity” of the UGCC in terms of ecclesial self-consciousness and
identity, the Holy See has not seen fit to grant or recognize its
patriarchal status.
Today, the creation by the Ecumenical
Patriarchate (EP) of a new, canonical Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU)
independent of Moscow, and the split in the Orthodox world occasioned by
Moscow’s defiance of that decision, would seem to remove some of the
obstacles to the creation of a UGCC patriarchate. After all, the
independent Ukrainian Orthodox are more amenable to ecumenical relations
with the Ukrainian Catholics than the Moscow Patriarchate, which
refuses to recognize the former and only grudgingly acknowledges the
existence of the latter. Thus, the newly autocephalous Ukrainian
Orthodox might be willing to countenance an upgrade in the status of
their Catholic co-nationals. Will a Greco-Catholic Patriarchate be the
surprise that Nuncio Gugerotti predicted?
And yet, the Ukrainian Orthodox might
not be all that enthused with the idea. OCU head Epifanii (Dumenko) is
only a metropolitan, and as such could understandably oppose a
full-fledged “Uniate” patriarchate in Kyiv. Even without the
complications posed by Honorary Patriarch Filaret’s views on the status
of the Kyivan see, the prospect of a UGCC Patriarchate of Kyiv and
Halych would likely meet with Ukrainian Orthodox resistance. It could
also annoy the Ecumenical Patriarchate and chill its potentially warmer
relations with the Catholic Church.
In fact, the Kyivan patriarchate
envisioned in the 1620s was conceived as a joint Uniate-Orthodox entity,
remaining in communion with both Rome and Constantinople. Forces on
both sides sank this ambitious dream. Could it be revived today? The
Orthodox would object to a merely local union, concluded without the
assent of all the Orthodox churches. Yet as a limited experiment,
conducted by agreement between Rome and Constantinople, would it gravely
harm the interests of either? Ukraine, after all, has served as a
“laboratory of ecumenism” before. And both Pope Francis and Patriarch
Bartholomew are bold innovators. Moreover, a gradual strategy of such piccoli passi
– “small steps” – to the reunification of the Eastern and Western
Churches might be more realistic than the utopian expectation of a
single grand amalgamation of the entire Catholic and all the Orthodox
Churches.
Such a long-term perspective, however,
would require the Catholic side to put the UGCC patriarchate on hold.
This might not be fair, for the struggle has been long and the
conditions have been met. The UGCC would merely be joining the
half-dozen Eastern Catholic churches (out of less than two dozen) that
have long enjoyed patriarchal status. Doesn’t the Church of the Martyrs
deserve this reward?
Yet the Greco-Catholics might be well
advised to consult with their Ukrainian Orthodox brethren before taking
such a step. Roman ecumenists, too, might discuss it with their Greek
partners in Istanbul. Such measures would not constitute false or
excessive deference to the Orthodox, but ecumenical prudence. Given the
broader considerations, to proclaim a Greco-Catholic patriarchate
without prior consultation with Kyiv and Constantinople might be
imprudent -- if not impudent.
