Sarah E. Yerkes, Public Orthodoxy
Sunday marks the fifth anniversary of the October 9, 2011 Maspero
massacre in which Egyptian army forces killed two dozen Egyptians,
mostly Coptic Christians, and injured hundreds more who were engaged in a
sit-in in front of the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (Maspero)
building.
The protests against the destruction of a church, and the
subsequent violent response, represent one of the lowest points in
Christian-Muslim relations in modern Egyptian history. Five years
later, despite attempts by both the current Egyptian government of
President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and the leadership of the Coptic church
to improve sectarian issues, the relationship between Muslims and
Christians in Egypt remains volatile. While President Sisi and Coptic
Pope Tawadros II have developed a strong, symbiotic relationship, there
are growing fissures between the Coptic leadership and the Coptic
community both in Egypt and abroad.
Pope Tawadros, who was selected in November 2012, during the
government of Egypt’s first Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, has
visibly and vocally supported President Sisi’s, seeing him as a welcome
alternative to Morsi. Pope Tawadros was in the front row when
then-General Sisi declared the successful removal of President Morsi
under whose rule Egypt witnessed an increase in sectarian violence
against Christians. And Tawadros has applauded President Sisi’s attempts
at national unity and has publicly urged the Coptic population around
the globe to join him expressing their support for Sisi’s government.
But, as I have written elsewhere, the relationship between Egypt’s Christian population and the Sisi government is complex, with a clear divide between de facto legal protection for Christians, enshrined in the constitution, and de jure
discrimination. Even under Sisi, who has gone to great lengths to
publicly demonstrate his belief in national unity, sectarian violence
remains commonplace. The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights counted
77 incidents of sectarian violence between 2011-2016 in Minya, home to
Egypt’s largest Christian community. Thus, as the Sisi-Tawadros
relationship has failed to reduce sectarian strife, instead only
papering over the problem, some Copts have grown frustrated with their
religious leaders’ inability to address sectarian issues and improve
life for Christians in Egypt.
The divide between the church leadership and the Coptic population
has recently come to light in the response to the revision of the church
construction law, passed on August 30. While the church has praised the
revised law, Coptic members of parliament as well as human rights
groups, have spoken out against the law, believing it is unlikely to
significantly alter the archaic and complex process of legally building a
new church, as it does not explicitly repeal any previous laws or
regulations. Furthermore, the church originally opposed the law, only
backing off after a series of closed-door negotiations between church
officials and a handful of high-level government officials, leaving
many, including parliamentarians, feeling left out.
The church construction law is just the latest example of the
challenges facing the official Coptic Orthodox church – who is stuck
between maintaining a positive working relationship with the state and
satisfying an increasingly angry Christian public and diaspora. When
Copts demonstrated this summer in front of the White House in
Washington, DC, against what they saw as the persecution of Christians
in Egypt, the Coptic church issued a statement
in the name of Pope Tawadros denouncing the protests because they might
“cause serious harm to Egypt, and greatly embarrass our senior
officials.”
The church also instructed its members not to participate in
demonstrations in August in front of the general prosecutor’s office in
Cairo demanding equality of law enforcement for people of all religions.
Furthermore, ahead of President Sisi’s visit to New York to attend the
UN General Assembly meetings in September, Coptic community leaders in
the United States distributed leaflets asking for American Copts to come
out in public support of Sisi.
But this pressure seems to backfiring. Increasingly, Egyptian
Christians are speaking out against the Egyptian government, ignoring
the wishes of the church. Most recently 82 Copts signed a public letter
protesting the church’s widespread support of Sisi and expressed
frustration that even under Sisi, the situation for Christians in Egypt
has not improved, with some going so far as to say it is worse than
under Mubarak.
Implications for the Future
This rift is worth watching for multiple reasons. First, if the split
between the Coptic population and church leadership deepens, there is
the potential for further violence and instability. Without the
protection of the church, the Coptic population is much more vulnerable
to both physical and rhetorical attack.
Second, Egypt’s sizable Christian community (between 5-15% of the
population) has regularly enjoyed outsized influence due to its
connections to international Christian groups and advocates of religious
freedom. The largest Coptic diaspora community is in the United States.
Thus, the US government has a particular interest in ensuring that the
rights of Egypt’s Christians are protected. The U.S. State Department’s
International Religious Freedom Report, for example, regularly chastises
the Egyptian government for failing to prevent religiously-motivated
violence or allowing perpetrators of that violence to act with impunity.
The report also regularly accuses the government of discrimination in
hiring practices and expresses dissatisfaction with the use of informal
reconciliation sessions instead of formal legal proceedings to address
religiously-motivated crimes after the fact. Should the Christian
population continue to speak out against the Sisi government, it will
draw further attention from the international community, creating an
even bigger problem than it already has.
Additionally, Sisi, who has been hemorrhaging support over his
inability to improve the economic situation, adequately address security
threats, and brutal crackdown on human rights, needs the support of
both the Coptic community and the church leaders. Although small in
numbers, should Copts withdraw their support for Sisi, it could spell
trouble for Sisi’s attempts at reelection in 2018.
Thus, President Sisi and his government would be wise to undertake
serious attempts at national unity – rather than relying on empty
rhetoric. A first step would be to end the use of reconciliation
sessions and instead ensure that Egyptians of all faiths are treated
equally under the law and that sectarian crimes are subject to the same
judicial and criminal procedures as other crimes. The Coptic church
should recognize the growing discontent within its ranks to engage in
frank discussions with the Egyptian government on these same issues.
Turning a blind eye to the growing crackdown on human rights does not
help the church, but rather damages the credibility of the church
leadership with its adherents. Finally, Egyptian Christians – both in
Egypt and abroad – should engage in serious dialogue with their church
leaders on how to best move Egypt forward and improve the lives of
Christians in Egypt.
Sarah E. Yerkes is a visiting fellow at the Brooking
Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy and an International Affairs
Fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations.