.png "English"){kind=small}
These golden church domes are of a pear-type shape common for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Photo: Ukrinform.ua, euromaidanpress.com
It’s hot times for the Church in
Ukraine. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine, now subordinate to Moscow,
could become independent aka autocephalous, fulfilling a long-lasting
dream going back to the first attempts at Ukrainian independence.
President Poroshenko’s appeal to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian
Church was supported by the Parliament and delivered to Ecumenical
Patriarch Bartholomew on 10 April 2018. A decision is expected in July.
Some say that an independent Ukrainian Church is a matter of national
security, others – that it is merely a PR move by Poroshenko prior to
elections. Apart from that, there’s the Church schism to be considered:
for the last 26 years, Orthodoxy in Ukraine has been split in between
the unrecognized yet popular Kyiv Patriarchate, the Moscow Patriarchate,
and the minor Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church.
Euromaidan Press sat down with Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun,
Acting Director of Huffington Ecumenical Institute, Assistant Professor
at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, former Chairman of the
Department for External Church Relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church (MP) , to talk about the prospects of Ukraine getting its very
own Church and what it would mean.
EP: The Ukrainian church structure is rather complex. Why
does Ukraine have such a structure? And what structures are we talking
about when discussion autocephaly?
Cyril Hovorun: The Ukrainian Church structure is
indeed rather unusual. In most Orthodox countries, there is one single
church. The idea of one Church for one nation reflects Orthodox Church
ecclesiology as it developed in the past, particularly in the Middle
Ages, and I would say it is normative in the Orthodox countries. In this
sense, Ukraine is not normative; however, this does not mean it is not
normal.
Currently,
the Orthodox faithful in Ukraine are divided between three Church
formations – the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate
(UOC MP, subjugated to the Russian Orthodox Church), Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP, formed in 1992), and the
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC, formed in 1921 and
reestablished in 1942). From the three, only the one under the Moscow
Patriarchate is canonical, meaning it’s in communion with the rest of
Orthodox Churches. The other two are regarded as schismatic by world
Orthodoxy.
While traditionally believers identifying with the Moscow Patriarchate outnumbered those of the Kyiv Patriarchate, Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine tipped the scales. The reason lies in the concept of the “Russian world,” backed by the Russian Orthodox Church. It has been widely regarded as an ideology driving the Russian-backed militants in Ukraine as well as reinforcing militaristic, xenophobic views of the Russian populace who give their support to Vladimir Putin, enabling Russian aggression against Ukraine.
“Canonical” means “legitimate,” one which is recognized as a church
by other Orthodox Churches, which recognize one another and are in
communion with one another.
EP: How many Churches are we talking about?
Cyril Hovorun: We are talking about 15 Churches
worldwide. Some of them are headed by patriarchs, i.e. patriarchates,
some are not but are nevertheless autocephalous churches. In this sense,
autocephaly is a normal status for an Orthodox Church. It is the only
form in which a church unit exists. It’s one of the most ancient and
most popular form of church organization.
Canonical territories of the autocephalous Orthodox Churches. Photo: orthodoxwiki.org, click to expand
EP: What does “autocephaly” mean?
Cyril Hovorun: The Orthodox Church doesn’t have a
pyramidal structure as the Catholic Church has. It doesn’t have a Pope.
There is a commonwealth of Orthodox Churches, similar to the British
Commonwealth. Autocephalous churches which belong to this family are
independent from one another but at the same time, they are in a close
relationship with one another, particularly – in eucharistic communion.
It means that I, as a member of the Russian Church, can go to the
Bulgarian Church and take communion there. That is a direct implication
for me as an ordinary member of my Church.
For imperial Russia, it was
important to keep the Ukrainian Church under its umbrella to preserve
the integrity of Ukraine in the Russian empire.
Applied to
Ukraine, it means that only one Church is in communion with the rest of
the Orthodox Churches, that is the Church of the Moscow Patriarchate,
the so-called Ukrainian Orthodox Church. It means that the members of
this Church can go to Cyprus, to Greece, and partake in Eucharist there.
The other two churches are not recognized, meaning that their members
would not normally be able to take communion in other churches
worldwide. Sometimes they do if they are not asked. But if they tell
that they belong to the Kyiv Patriarchate, the priest would normally not
be able to give communion to that person. And that is the consequence
of this non-recognized status of the other Orthodox Churches in Ukraine,
UOC KP and UAOC.
It’s not so much whether those Churches are non-canonical pe se,
as are the implications of this status of the Church for the faithful
who belong to those churches. Those members feel as sort of second-class
members of the Orthodox community. They are not allowed to take
communion in other Churches, they can’t be fully received even if they
go to pilgrimages for instance to the Holy Land or Mount Athos.
EP: Why did these Churches form in the first place?
Cyril Hovorun: They reemerged in Ukraine after the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Ukrainian
state. I said “reemerged” in the sense that they did not emerge from
scratch. There were precedents in the XX ct. The moment when the
independent Ukrainian state, the Ukrainian People’s Republic was
established in 1917, attempts to establish an independent Ukrainian
Church were made as well. Again, rather unsuccessfully, because the
pressure from Russia was huge, and when Soviet Russia occupied Ukraine,
they eventually crushed any attempt to establish an independent
Ukrainian church.
Since then, it has become a sort of rule for the Russian state to
prevent the independence of the Ukrainian church, because this would
secure a common political space where Ukraine would be included. For
imperial Russia, it was important to keep the Ukrainian Church under its
umbrella to preserve the integrity of Ukraine in the Russian empire.
With the new independence of Ukraine in 1991, there presan attempt to
reestablish an independent Ukrainian Church. The Russian state opposed
those attempts as they opposed attempts at the start of the XX ct.
So, the non-canonical unrecognized status of two Ukrainian Churches
owes itself to a great extent to Russia. We observe how the efforts of
the Russian politicians, not only the Church but also the Russian
diplomacy and state machinery, have increased to prevent this from
happening.
In Ukraine, the institute of Church autocephaly, which is the most
ancient form of Church governance, is sometimes interpreted as an
instrument of colonization or decolonization, even though this institute
appeared and was adopted by the Church before any colonial kind of
idea.
EP: You mentioned that Russia prevents Ukraine from
establishing an autocephalous Church because it doesn’t want the country
to create its own political space. However, Ukraine now has a secular
state, the Church is separated from the state. How can we talk about a
political space?
Cyril Hovorun: Ukraine is certainly not a religious
state, according to its Constitution. It’s not a theocracy, it doesn’t
have an established Church in the same sense as some European countries
have, like Germany or Finland.
The ideology of the “Russian
world” is religious as such, it’s not a secular ideology. Its religious
rhetoric rides on the counterposition of the east and west, of the
presumably holy, religious, spiritual East, and godless West
At the same time, the Ukrainian society is ultimately religious, it’s
more religious than most European countries, its religiosity can be
compared to the Polish society. In the political and social discourse,
religion plays a very important role in Ukraine.
This religious discourse played a very important role during the
Euromaidan revolution. Maidan was a political phenomenon, a
manifestation of the people who wanted political change. At the same
time, the way how the demands of the people were expressed in Ukraine
was not secular, it was religious. People articulated political and
social concepts through religious symbols and they participated in
everyday prayer on the Maidan. A lot of priests and bishops ascended to
the scene of the Maidan and addressed people.
One
of the most famous photographs from the Euromaidan revolution: a cross
above the clashes between protesters and riot police during night
attempts to disperse the protest camp, 11 December 2013/ Nina Beroieva
Read also: The Church in the Bloodlands
So, Maidan was a religious phenomenon in some sense, and this exactly
indicated the priorities and ways in which Ukrainian people express
themselves. Even if Ukrainians don’t go necessarily to church regularly,
they still understand themselves in a religious sense, a sort of
cultural Christianity. That’s why the idea of autocephaly stirred so
much controversy and interest in the Ukrainian society.
Besides that, the Russian aggression against Ukraine was also
expressed, articulated and moved by religiously charged rhetoric. The
ideology of the “Russian world” is religious as such, it’s not a secular
ideology. Its religious rhetoric rides on the counterposition of the
east and west, of the presumably holy, religious, spiritual East, and
godless West. It renders the conflict in Ukraine in the terms of the
counterposition of the Orthodox civilization and the opposite
civilization, like the Catholic, Protestant or atheist civilizations.
This rhetoric has been constructed by the Church and it means that
the aggression against Ukraine has a religious dimension, just as the
Maidan had a religious dimension even though it was a political and
social phenomenon. They are the opposite side of two very different
interpretations of religion. I think the interpretation of the Maidan
was non-violent, and interpretation of religion as a constructive force,
as one that can help build civil society. Through the “Russian world,”
Russian aggression against Ukraine is another interpretation of religion
as a force that rebukes democratic and civic social values.
Priests leading an interconfessional prayer on the Euromaidan stage. From the book “Maidan and the Church”
Given that the rhetoric of the Russian world is religiously charged,
that the Russian aggression features a very strong religious dimension,
many people who come to fight to Ukraine on the Russian side, they are
motivated religiously.
The status of the Ukrainian autocephaly is no more solely an issue
for the churches; it is now a political issue, a security issue if you
want. To a great extent, it’s a precondition for the survival of the
Ukrainian state and society. Hence the concerns regarding the status of
the Ukrainian church, because Moscow has used this status since the
collapse of the Russian empire as an instrument to colonize Ukraine. So,
the issue of autocephaly for the Ukrainian state is a chance for the
decolonization for Ukraine.
EP: But maybe this idea of autocephaly is a PR move by Poroshenko?
Poroshenko articulated the
concerns of many Ukrainian Orthodox Christians: ecclesial recognition by
the world-wide orthodoxy, liberated from Russian neo-imperial rhetoric
and activities
Cyril Hovorun: Certainly, it
will contribute to his electoral campaign, and it has already become a
part of his campaign. It’s not a coincidence that Poroshenko initiated
this step when the campaign began. I should say that initiatives to
change the ecclesial situation in Ukraine began after the Maidan. There
were initiatives from the Churches to offer a solution to this
ecclesial-political issue during the war of Russia against Ukraine.
Poroshenko for most of his time as president impeded any solution to
this issue. He came up with this initiative only recently. I think his
rationale is complex. It may be personal, as he’s a faithful member of
the UOC MP. It can be political: he understands that this issue
contributes to the war. But it’s also political because it may
contribute to his reelection. If it will be successful, it will give him
a very strong chance to get reelected for the second time. If he fails,
because this initiative is now so grossly associated with his name, his
chances to get reelected will decrease dramatically.
Although this initiative is presented as political, what Poroshenko
did is just articulated the concerns of many Ukrainian Orthodox
Christians: ecclesial recognition by the world-wide orthodoxy, liberated
from Russian neo-imperial rhetoric and activities. He and many people
who help him to promote the idea in the Ukrainian political
establishment also associate themselves with the UOC MP. And they
represent the many Ukrainian Orthodox who disagree with the policies and
rhetoric of the Russian Church but don’t have an alternative canonical
Church to go to. This creates a very severe dilemma for their
consciousness.
On the one hand, they want to go to a canonical church, to be in
communion with the rest of the Orthodox Christians worldwide. The only
outlet for this communion is the church of the MP; at the same time,
they disagree with the rhetoric, the statements, and sometimes, with the
absence of statements which sometimes is more telling. Like on war:
while the other Churches are outspoken on war and aggression, the UOC MP
has never condemned the war. It has never even named the war by its
proper name, as war. This creates obstacles for people who go to that
Church. So, this is a major concern for many, including people from the
political establishment who go to it. I cannot read thoughts, but I
think that Poroshenko himself as a personality and a Christian has
problems of this sort.parti
Representatives
of the UOC MP, including Metropolitan Onufriy, were the only ones
remaining sitting while President Poroshenko read aloud the names of
soldiers honored as Heroes of Ukraine while fighting against the
Russian-separatist forces in Donbas on 8 May 2015. Later, the press
service of the UOC MP explained the sit-in as a protest against war as a
phenomenon. Photo: lb.ua
So, they are giving chance to those people facing these dilemmas to
go to a canonical Church and feel relieved that they do not subscribe to
the Russian aggression, Russian rhetoric when they go to church, and
improve their spiritual life. To be fair, this should be done by the
churches: it is the business of the churches to relieve people from
political agendas. But unfortunately, the churches themselves don’t
contribute that much, particularly UOC MP. So, the politicians
interfered. Maybe it’s not the perfect scenario of solving this problem,
but it’s the only possible one at this moment.
EP: How would this autocephaly look like? Who would get it in Ukraine, what would happen afterwards?
Cyril Hovorun: It’s still not 100% clear what it
will look like. But I can say for sure that it will not be given to any
existing Church, but a new structure will be established from the
existing elements. Diocesan [administrative-territorial – Ed.]
structures of the existing Churches will be included in this new Church,
and autocephaly will be given to this new structure. Probably, most of
the communities that will enter this structure belong to the
Patriarchate of Kyiv. But it is also expected that many communities and
even dioceses of the Moscow Patriarchate will join it, as well as the
third tiny UAOC. There are also expectations that communities from the
Greek Catholic Church will join eventually, because so far in the
situation of Russian aggression against Ukraine, many members of the UOC
MP left and joined the Greek Catholic Church, as for them, it was the
only recognized legitimate alternative. They may come back to this new
established Church.
I think the procedure will ride on the precedent which existed in
1924 when after the collapse of the Russian Empire part of the Russian
Church in Poland was granted autocephaly by the Patriarchate of
Constantinople. This was done in a unilateral way, without consultations
with other Churches, referring to the fact that before the end of the
XVII ct. that Church belonged to the Patriarchate of Constantinople.
EP: Is Church autocephaly for Ukraine a new idea?
Cyril Hovorun: The Church of Kyiv was established in
the X ct. as a Metropolis of the Church of Constantinople and it
existed as such until the end of the XVII century. So, we can say that
the Ukrainian Church, even though at that time it was called the Church
of Kyiv, for most of its history existed under the umbrella of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople.
A
monument to Prince Volodymyr, who baptized the Kyivan Rus in 988 and
thus laid the foundations of the Kyiv Church, stands on the hills of
Kyiv
When the Church of Kyiv was established in the X ct., it became an
integral part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and existed as such for a
long time. But after the Tatar-Mongol invasion of the XIII ct. which
devastated central Kyivan Rus and divided its heritage between two
emerging principalities – Moscow and Lithuania-Poland, a division
emerged within the Church of Kyiv.
One part, as part of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, went to the
northeastern part of what was then Kyivan Rus and became the Church of
Moscow. In 1448, it proclaimed unilaterally, without consultations with
another Church, its autocephaly, which was illegal and remained illegal
for 150 years. At that time, the Church of Moscow was schismatic and not
in communion with other Churches.
Another part of the Church remained faithful to the Ecumenical
Patriarchate till the XVII ct., and its center moved to the territories
of the Polish-Lithuanian state, and then it was given to be managed by
Moscow, remaining an integral part of the Patriarchate of
Constantinople. At that time, the Moscow Church was already recognized
by the rest of the Churches, thanks to the effort of the Russian Tsars.
After
the Tatar-Mongol invasion devastated Kyiv in 1240, the Kyiv Church was
split in two. One part laid the foundation of the Church of the emerging
Moscow principality, which grew into the UOC MP.
We can see a similar “managing” situation, in Greece, where some
dioceses are given to be managed by the of the Autocephalous Greek
Church, but still belong to the Patriarchate of Constantinople. And they
are obliged to commemorate the Patriarchate of Constantinople. In the
Moscow Church, this tradition of commemorating the Patriarchate of
Constantinople was abolished very soon after the transaction of the part
of the Kyiv Church at the territories of the Polish-Lithuanian state.
And because of the violations of the conditions of passing this
Metropolis of Kyiv to Moscow, the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the
XX ct. claimed its rights back, and that was the rationale of the Tomos
for the autocephaly of the Polish Church in 1924. I assume that the same
rationale will be invoked in the Tomos granted by the Patriarchate of
Constantinople to Ukraine again.
It’s ironic that the Church
which was uncanonical for 150 years, which separated from the canonical
Church, now accuses its sister in doing the same.
Regarding the
Tomos, it’s important to understand that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is
not creating something new, but is claiming back its own rights.
However, now Constantinople is ready to give autocephaly to this Church,
and this is new. In 2008, under President Yushchenko, there was another
attempt to establish an independent from Moscow Church in Ukraine.
Then, while Yushchenko aimed for an autocephalous Church, Constantinople
had a different vision about this Church, it wanted it back under its
jurisdiction. There was a clash between these two models, which was one
of the reasons why the initiative failed.
Nowadays, Constantinople seems to have agreed to grant independence
to the Ukrainian new Church. But this story did not begin in 2008, it
began in XIX ct. Then, the Ottoman Empire and Habsburg Empires, which
included vast Orthodox populations (although they still constituted
minorities in those empires), experienced a national awakening and
struggled for independence, sometimes with wars against the imperial
centers. At that time, autocephaly became a big issue for those empires,
as autocephaly was a vehicle for the national independence of Orthodox
nations: the Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians, Montenegrins,
Macedonians, and so forth.
A stamp celebrating Romanian Church autocephaly, granted in 1885
In the beginning of the XX ct., the same movement continued regarding
the Russian Empire. After its collapse, the Orthodox nations felt they
were not Russians, they claimed their own national identity, continuing
the same anti-imperial trend of the Balkans, and claimed autocephaly for
themselves. Some of those claims succeeded, some failed. For instance,
the Polish Church succeeded. The Polish state was established at the
beginning of the XX ct. after the collapse of the Russian empire, and
the Church managed to get its independence in 1924. Also, the Finnish
Church succeeded. It was an intrinsic part of the Russian Church, and
they managed not to get complete independence, but they were satisfied
with an autonomous status within the Church of Constantinople.
Ukraine was also engaged in this national struggle at the beginning
of the XX ct. But because the Ukrainian state failed, it could not
enforce an autocephalous Church. The Ukrainian independence movement was
quashed by Soviet Russia and this applied to the Ukrainian Church as
well. Until the Ukrainian state reemerged again in 1991, carrying hopes
for a Ukrainian Church with it.
EP: What’s in Ukrainian Church autocephaly for Russia?
Cyril Hovorun: In the situation of war and Russian
aggression, Russian political influence has diminished significantly.
There are practically no Russian institutions on Ukrainian soil, at
least formally, except one: the Church. And the Church of the Moscow
Patriarchate in Ukraine has become closer to Russia than it used to be
before the war.
After the Orange Revolution of 2004, the UOC MP tried to distance
itself from Moscow, tried to prove it is really a Ukrainian Church which
understands the aspirations of Ukrainian society. It became effectively
independent under Metropolitan Volodymyr, who passed away in 2014.
The new Primate of the Ukrainian Church, Metropolitan Onufriy, it
seems, did not continue this line. People who emerged to the leadership
of the Church collaborated with the regime of Yanukovych very closely,
and they continued somehow to function in the line of the successors of
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, the Opposition Bloc. They affiliated
themselves quite obviously with Russian interests. Sometimes they
function as representatives of those interests. For Russia, this is
important, because given the lack of other outposts of Russian interests
on Ukrainian soil, the Ukrainian Church is one of those scarce
resources that the Kremlin uses. Unfortunately, the Church does
contribute to that. It does not distance itself from the influence of
the Kremlin.
EP: Why have the UOC MP representatives affiliated themselves with the Party of Regions and its successor, the Opposition Bloc?
Cyril Hovorun: I can’t answer this question. One
can assume it has to do with different forms of support of the
leadership of the Church by the figures in the Opposition Bloc. What is
obvious is the deep involvement of an oligarch and member of the of
Opposition Bloc, the MP Vadym Novinsky. He is one of the most
influential figures of this political force and is very deeply involved
in the matters of the Church. He advocates the interests of the UOC MP
and, I think, influences those interests, which raises concerns about
the influence of oligarchy on the Church.
Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun. Photo: Euromaidan Press
It’s a big issue for Ukrainian society, the role of the oligarchy.
Most Ukrainians detest the idea that oligarchs should influence
politics. Unfortunately, this applies to the Church too, and even on a
greater scale. We are now entering a new electoral cycle, elections will
happen in one year, and the Party of Regions, which is now the
Opposition Bloc, wants revenge, and they will use the Church as a
vehicle of this comeback. Unfortunately, the Church yields to these
political interests and plays on their side.
The battle for Church autocephaly became the battle for Church diplomacies in a sense.
I want to emphasize again that there is a huge difference between some
leaders of the UOC MP, who seem to play on the side of political
figures, and the majority of the faithful of this Church. Some leaders
I’ve mentioned lead the Church to a confrontation with Ukrainian
society, unnecessarily. This confrontation is not something which the
Church would naturally support. I don’t see any reason for a clash
between Ukrainian society and the Church. However, the Party of Regions
aka Opposition Bloc, in order to get support in the next electoral
cycle, needs this confrontation, because it can come back to power only
riding on it. In this, it coincides with the interests of the Kremlin,
which wants to divide Ukrainian society. Hence, all this rhetoric about
the persecution of the Orthodox in Ukraine, which people in Europe hear
from the UOC MP, the Opposition Bloc, and the Kremlin. These are usually
false statements which contribute to the confrontation, as there are no
persecutions. The only thing that happens is that all religious groups
in Ukraine are being treated equally in front of the law. From the
perspective of the UOC MP, which was privileged in Yanukovych’s time,
this is interpreted as persecutions against the Church.
EP: What do the other Orthodox Churches think about Ukraine’s autocephaly?
Cyril Hovorun: It’s difficult to predict the
statements of the other Churches. The battle for Church autocephaly
became the battle for Church diplomacies in a sense. Moscow sends its
representatives to different Churches to persuade them not to support
this movement towards normalization of the church life in Ukraine, and
the Ukrainian state tries to use diplomatic means and to persuade the
other Churches to support the Ukrainian cause. Who will win – we will
see. Unfortunately, the issue of recognition from other Churches has
become politicized. Many political factors are at play here. Pressure
upon the Ecumenical Patriarchate from the Turkish government, for
instance. Also, governments in other Orthodox countries will play some
role, and those governments will be motivated or demotivated
economically and politically by the Kremlin. So, unfortunately, politics
will play an important role in the process of recognition by other
Churches. What is needed, even though the Ecumenical Patriarchate will
make its decision unilaterally, it will also pursue the process of
recognition of the autocephalous Church by other Churches.
EP: Anything else you would like to add?
Cyril Hovorun: Yes. I believe the model of
autocephaly for the Ukrainian Church which is being considered nowadays
is a model of plurality. 10 years ago, the model promoted by president
Yushchenko was one single Church which will unite all the Orthodox under
its umbrella. This would be easy to manage by the state, obviously.
Nowadays, we are talking about a different model, it’s a model of one of
several recognized jurisdictions in Ukraine, meaning there will be no
monopoly of any Church structure and no monopoly from the state upon any
Church. It will contribute to diversity in Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and
this diversity will be legitimate, canonical. I think it will contribute
to the change of mentality regarding religious issues. The idea of one
single Church, though it is normal for the Orthodox world, doesn’t help
the current situation in Ukraine. If the Orthodox accept the idea that
there can be several canonical Churches in one state, they will more
easily appreciate the other religious diversity in the country. The
Ukrainian society is very religious, it’s not secular, and it’s
religiously diverse. There are many Protestants, Catholics of different
sorts, Muslims, Jews. I think Ukrainians learned to appreciate this
religious diversity, especially on the Maidan. The autocephaly of the
Orthodox Church will contribute to the diversity of this landscape.
EP: So you’re saying UOC MP is not going anywhere?
Cyril Hovorun: No, it will stay, and it’s good that it will stay because it will contribute to this diversity.
EP: Let’s hope that everything works!
Cyril Hovorun: No, everything will not work. Let’s hope that something will work.
/Interview by Alya Shandra
