MOSCOW THREATENS ORTHODOX SPLIT ON THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALY

MOSCOW THREATENS ORTHODOX SPLIT ON THE UKRAINIAN AUTOCEPHALY

Fr. Cyril Hovorun's interview to Liga.net

Constantinople is ready to give the Ukrainian Orthodox Church independence from Moscow, despite serious external and internal pressure. The question now is whether he can defend his decision. With the announcement that the Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate has begun the procedures necessary to provide autocephaly to the UOC, in April President Petro Poroshenko spoke. With such a request, he and the parliament turned to the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew. Russia will not be able to stop this anymore - the Russian Orthodox Church does not have the right to veto the decisions of Bartholomew, he said.
But in order to prevent the Ukrainian church from getting autocephaly, since there is no veto right - Russia has other levers of influence, including threats and blackmail. Archimandrite of the ROC, doctor of philosophy and theologian , Fr. Cyril Hovorun warns about it.
Fr. Cyril Hovorun (CH) during his ecclesiastical career, held high posts in the structure of the church. He headed the Department of Foreign Relations in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. In 2009, he was suddenly transferred to a second-rate post of deputy head of the academic committee of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow and "placed at the disposal of Patriarch Kirill." This relegation was oddly related to attempts by UOC to gain autocephaly, which Hovorun had openly supported.
"Starting from 2009-2010, I saw the theory of the Rushsky Mir (Russian world) actively developed within the Russian Orthodox Church, which was then borrowed by the Kremlin to begin the aggression against Ukraine, and warned of its dangers and catastrophic consequences, but there was no understanding, and I quitted my job," - said Hovorun in an interview to LIGA.net.

After his retirement, he received an invitation to Yale University, and has since worked in academic institutions in the United States.

Cyril Hovorun explained to LIGA.net  (LN) that Russia threatens the Ecumenical Patriarchate, not to let Poroshenko really achieve the independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and the UOC-MP clergy - now and in 2014 – to  talk about the autocephaly.

- LN: The Autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which has been discussed about for a decade and whose talks have resumed in the last month, is a purely pre-election PR Poroshenko, or is it really possible now?

- CH: In my opinion, this is a coincidence in time of several factors. First of all, Patriarch Bartholomew matured to this decision. For a long time he was persuaded that the solution of the Ukrainian church problem was premature. Back in 2008, when the patriarch was visiting Kiev at the invitation of then-President Yushchenko, he was close to making this move. True, this was originally foreseen in a slightly different format.

-LN: And what is the autocephaly that is being discussed now, different from the version of Yushchenko?

-CH: In 2008, it was not the autocephalous church discussed, but the renewal of the subordination of the Kiev Metropolitanate to the Constantinople Patriarchate, which ceased at the end of the 17th century. That is, in 2008 it was supposed to first return the Ukrainian Metropolia to the homophorion of the Ecumenical Patriarch, and only later, in the indefinite future, give it autocephaly. Now it is about full independence for the church right away. Patriarch Bartholomew went a long way toward this move. How final is the decision that he has taken for himself we will soon see.

-LN: What is the role of Poroshenko in this process?

- CH: Obviously, from the point of view of President Poroshenko, the church question can become a chance for him to be reelected for a second term. We all see what his ratings and prospects are (they are low). He needs some sort of breakthrough ahead of the election, in the period when the country enters the electoral cycle. Moreover, Poroshenko is unlikely to be considered the initiator of this process, as, for example, was Yushchenko. For the past four years, from the first day of his presidency, various structures inside Ukraine, from churches to special services, called on him to solve this issue. Because he ceased to be purely a church issue and became a matter of national security. He was offered various projects and ideas, but he always put the case in the box. It was his conscious political decision. And only now he decided to give way to the initiatives. Poroshenko can be compared to a dam that kept water for a long time, and then the gateways opened, and it flooded. The fact that this flow has become irresistible can thank the dam, but it must be understood that this dam has for a long time kept the flow of water. There is one more factor associated with the UOC-MP itself. Until 2014, they tried to build a dialogue with society, to show empathy to what worried most people in Ukraine. Such was the policy of the late Metropolitan Vladimir. But after 2014, the policy of the UOC changed towards self-isolation and conflict with society. In addition, the UOC-MP stopped showing sympathy for what worries the society - at a time when society needed most of all. Instead, empathy on the part of this church was limited to very narrow groups of people either inside the church or outside it, but not on the Ukrainian side.

As a result of that, the UOC-MP with very fast pace has lost the trust credit that society gave it during the time of Metropolitan Vladimir. This, accordingly, posed the question of an alternative to society and the authorities, and now we are witnessing the process of seeking such an alternative with the help of Constantinople. Therefore, the leadership of the UOC-MP should blame in the current situation, first of all, itself.

-LN: Is this a conscious policy of the leadership of the church?

- CH: Yes, the leadership of the UOC-MP simply chose the path of isolation and marginalization within Ukraine. On the one hand, this is dictated by the mentality of the head of the church, Metropolitan Onuphrius, an introvert, who extrapolates his prayer isolation to the whole church. Prayer is necessary for the Church, but the entire history of Christianity teaches that it must be complemented by active compassion and prophetic ministry. This service is among other things in order to name things by their names: war for example. Instead, we hear from the church speakers some meaningless euphemisms. On the other hand, under the influence of the member of the Ukrainian Parliament Vadim Novinsky, the leadership of the UOC-MP chose a path of confrontation with Ukrainian society in order to give the political force of this oligarch new chances in the next political cycle. Party of Regions - I will not use euphemism "Opposition bloc", let's name things by their names - trying to make a revenge possible only with the presence of a public confrontation with the current authorities and the most active part of Ukrainian society. And he uses the UOC-MP to achieve his political goals. I would say the struggle for the use of the church resource has started with the Party of Regions - remember the recent initiative of Mikhail Dobkin to create a Christian-socialist party. I understand how the resources of the UOC-MP will work in favor of the Party of Regions, but I do not quite understand how this will work for the benefit of the church. The real chasm separates the interests of the majority in the UOC-MP from the interests of Novinsky and those hierarchs whom he supports and inspires in various ways on the implementation of his church-political projects.

- LN: What is the role of Novinsky in this policy? How much is he an independent figure?

- CH: Novinsky, and I have reason to think so, get general directions and directives from outside, and how to implement them for himself. Let's say, he's a creative operator of someone else's politics. He has resources for it. I admit that he receives some resources specifically to influence the policy of the church. And it is not only about the UOC-MP, but also about some other churches. In particular, there were cases of his influence on the decisions of the UAOC.
Unfortunately, there were always oligarchs around the church who tried to influence her position. An example of such a person (now almost nothing is heard about him, and once he was a very influential figure and oligarch) - Victor Nusenkis, who was trying to turn his financial help into political influence in every possible way. When his attempts went too far, Metropolitan Vladimir refused receive his help, although at that time he needed it. Is the current leadership of the UOC-MP ready to give up Novinsky's services? I do not know. But the degree of his influence on the affairs of the church greatly outnumbered the role that Nusenkis once played.

-LN: And there are priests who also receive instructions from special services?

-CH: I think there are. But to answer this question is within the competence of the Ukrainian special services.

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 LN: You say that the Patriarch Bartholomew has matured for autocephaly, but it is still unclear how complete his decision is. What determines its finality? What can interfere?

-CH:  He accepted this decision for himself, taking into account all possible risks. The risks are very large both for him and for the universal Orthodoxy. Because Moscow threatens the global schism is akin to the one that exists between Catholic and Orthodox churches for a thousand years.

-LN: Is there a global split in Orthodoxy?

-CH. Yes, there is such a risk. And Patriarch Bartholomew knows it perfectly. Obviously, he decided to go ahead, even in spite of this risk. But he is in an environment that is not very favorable for the church itself. There is a Turkish state with its own policy. Since the time of the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, since the establishment of the Turkish Republic after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a purposeful policy of displacing the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the edge of the socio-political life of the country is being implemented. And, of course, the Patriarch depends on the general political context of Turkey.
At the moment, Turkey has a situational alliance with Russia, especially in Syria. However, it remains a permanent ally of the United States as a NATO member. These political details also play a role. My subjective impression is that one more factor that just gave the Ukrainian church a chance for autocephaly, was the intensification of US sanctions policy towards Russia. I do not exclude that this has affected the fact that Turkey has now weakened its pressure on the Ecumenical Patriarchate.

-LN: How about the autocephaly dialogue in the UOC-MP itself?

-CH:  The solution of the question of autocephaly, in and of itself, and within the UOC-MP, has long been overestimated. What's happening just now was more appropriate in 2014. Then a significant number of priests, laity, and even bishops would like to go to the autocephalous church. Now there is less such a mood. Plus, in 2014, most Orthodox churches all over the world were in solidarity with Ukraine, which suffered under conditions of open aggression. Four years later, including through the active work of Moscow church diplomacy and its propaganda, a significant part of these churches either took a neutral position, or Moscow was motivated to support its position. That is, intra-church preconditions for autocephaly are now weaker than in 2014.

- LN: They say that in the UOC ten years ago, at the beginning of the dialogue, one third of bishops was behind autocephaly, a third was Muscovites, the rest did not care. And what are the proportions now?

-CH: To tell the truth, I do not know such statistics. Such analytical opinions were more likely to be speculative than sociological data. These data are very difficult to get inside the church. After all, there people can say one, but think differently. According to my personal observations, in 2014, a significant number of believers and clergy, and even the episcopate within the UOC-MP, became supporters of independence from Moscow. Then the number of indifferent fell, because the events were shocking for everyone. And now in the church, as in society, indifference and inertia grow. People got caught up with the new situation. And in this sense it is much more difficult for people of the church to be encouraged to show an active position.

-LN: If Constantinople moves to active actions on autocephaly of the UOC, what will be the next procedure? And how long does it require?

- CH: As I understand this, it is a matter of literally  few months, during which the question must be solved. The procedure is as follows. In Istanbul, the Holy Synod of the Constantinople Church is convened, which is authorized to make decisions on such matters. In this synod there are hierarchs who live in Turkey and are its permanent members, as well as hierarchs who serve around the world and change in rotation. So far, according to the lists of the synod, one can judge that the voices will be both behind and against. But the voice of the Patriarch is extremely important in the synod. If he makes such a decision, then there are many chances that he will be approved.
To make it clearer, I will draw a parallel with the Parliament. The Synod is like a Parliament that votes for the law. The Patriarch is like the President, who signs it. It is the synod as a collective body, not Patriarch Bartholomew alone, issuing a document. If there is a majority of votes, then the decision comes into force, and it is first signed by the Patriarch, and then all the members of the synod. After this document, it is called "tomos" - this document is on two or three pages, comes into force. And the church in Ukraine gets autocephaly.

- LN: If the votes are divided, then what are the chances that the "Ukrainian question" will outweigh?

- CH: I think now there is every chance that the decision will gather the required number of votes. It will be based on a precedent. A similar tomos was accepted in 1924, when they gave autocephaly to the Polish Orthodox Church. In that time, she was part of the Kiev Metropolitanate. The motivation to provide autocephaly to the Polish church is the same as in the case of Ukraine. First of all, this is a violation by Moscow of the conditions of control over the Kievan metropolitanate. The Metropolis passed to Moscow's administration in 1686 under certain conditions, which were violated virtually immediately. The tomos of 1924 also referred to this: since the conditions were violated, the Polish church gets autocephaly.
I think the same argument will be given now, almost a hundred years later. I am sure that 70-80% of the text of the new tomos will be borrowed from the document of 1924.

-LN: Can Moscow still influence the decision of Constantinople? To stir?

-CH: Moscow already does this in a variety of ways. That is also the problem that the Ecumenical Patriarchate is sensitive to very many factors of influence, both internal and external. And each of them will be used. The question is, if there are enough forces in Constantinople to stop it.

- LN: And desires.

- CH: The desire seems to be there. And enough of strength - let's see.

- LH: Before 2014, the UOC-MP had much more supporters of independent policy from Moscow. Why then, over these four years, most of the conflicts arise precisely around the UOC-MP? That they refuse to pray for the military, then for the child, the priests are photographed with the Russian militants. The latest scandal is the Brazilian Lucurga, who fought on the side of the militants, and now lives in a monastery.

- CH: The UOC is a very large church structure, the largest in Ukraine. And very multilayered. I know a lot of priests who completely disagree with such episodes. These cases are rather isolated and do not represent the entire church. However, the UOC is identified with them because the leadership has never condemned them, which makes the blame a collective one.

- LN: Perhaps the reason is also that the UOC is a branch of the Russian Orthodox Church with its Russian world?

-CH: Not so simply. One should distinguish between the leadership of the UOC and the lower levels of it, the clergy. Most priests only suffer from the policy of leadership. But they cannot influence the situation, they cannot even speak, otherwise they will immediately be sanctioned. With the disciplinary measures in the church, everything is very simple. As far as I know, many within the UOC are waiting for a chance when Ukraine will have a canonical alternative to the policy of isolation and confrontation that the leadership of this church is currently conducting.

Source: http://www.liga.net/politics/interview/moskva-ugrojaet-globalnym-raskolom-za-avtokefaliyu-upts (translated into English by the administrator)