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Towards a New Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Talk with Cyril Hovorun)
Interviewed by Rastko Jović, draft translation into english for the Serbian :Panorthodox Synod
Archimandrite Cyril Hovorun, a priest of the Ukrainian Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church, is an associate professor at Bogoslovski Studies, Lojola Marimaunt University of Los Angeles, and executive director of the Hafington Ecumenical Institute. He graduated at the Bogoslovska Academy in Kiev and the National University of Athens. He completed his doctoral studies at Darham (Durham) University, under the leadership of. Andrew Louth. He was chairman of the Department of Foreign Relations of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate [MP]), First Deputy Chairman of the Educational Board of the Russian Orthodox Church, and later a research associate at Yale and Columbia University, as well as the Vice-Dean of St. Ignatius Theological Institute in Sweden. He has published several books in various languages: Political Orthodoxy: Church Orthodoxy: The Unorthodoxies of the Church Coerced, Minneapolis: Fortress, 2018; Ukrainian Public Theology (Ukrainian Public Theology, Kyiv: Dukh and Litera, 2017, in Ukrainian), Scaffolds of the Church: Towards poststructural Ecclesiology, Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017; Ukrainian translation published in 2018 ); Wonders of the All-Orthodox Parliament (Moscow: Christian Book Club, 2016, in Russian); Meta-Ecclesiology: Chronicles of the Church's Presence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; Ukrainian translation published in 2017); From Antioch to Siana: The Evolution of "Northeastern" (From Antioch to Xi'an: An Evolution of 'Nestorianism', Hong Kong: Chinese Orthodox Press, 2014, in Chinese); Will, action and freedom: Christological controversies in the seventh century (Will, Action and Freedom: Christological Controversies in the Seventh Century, Leiden - Boston: Brill, 2008).
For our site, we talked to him about the situation in Ukraine, the positions of the Ecumenical and Moscow Patriarchates, the future Ukrainian Orthodox Church, etc.
RJ: In The Scaffolds of the Church, one of your main thesis is that autocephaly and autonomy in the past have been used as tools for the emancipation of people and the church. In what sense does Ukraine need emancipation, 27 years after independence?
CH: Indeed, after my research of the historical evolution of autocephaly, I came to the conclusion that there is a complete difference between this institution in its medieval and modern versions. Medieval autocephalies were applied in order to build empires. Such were autocephalic movements in medieval Bulgaria, Serbia and Moscow, which in fact provoked the Roman (Byzantine) empire and tried to replace it with their own empires. In order to achieve this goal, they used the autocephaly instrument. In modern times, when Serbia and other Balkan nations fought for emancipation from the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, they re-entered the autocephaly instrument. This time, however, the autocephaly was not an instrument for the building of an empire, but, on the contrary, an instrument for its destruction - i.e. has become a nation-building facility. The Serbian and Bulgarian autocephalies evolved from imperial to anti-imperial, but the Russian autocephaly remained the same as in medieval times. Moreover, even in modern times, it continues to contribute to the construction of the empire. From the Russian point of view, Ukraine is the cornerstone of every Russian neo-imperial project. In this perspective, the Russians can only support their own autocephaly, but they cannot accept the Ukrainian one. When Russia began its aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (MP) remained the only Russian imperial office in Ukraine. For this reason, most people in Ukraine believe that emancipation from a neo-Soviet empire requires that they have their own Orthodox Church as autocephalous. The typological, Ukrainian reasoning of the autocephaly is identical to the Serbian or other Balkan attempts in the 19th century. The only difference between the Ukrainian and Serbian cases is that the first one is postponed.
RJ: If Constantinople grants a Tomos of autocephaly, which Orthodox church structure will receive it? UOC (MP), UPC (KP), UAC? As far as I know, the UOC (MP), as the only canonical church, did not send such a request, enjoying autonomy at this time.
CH: Some bishops UPC (MP) have signed a petition to the previous Russian patriarch for giving a Ukrainian autocephalous church. Such petitions were also sent to Fanar by other Ukrainian-Orthodox jurisdictions. An autocephaly-Tomos would be the answer to these demands. However, it will not be given to any church that prayed for it, but to a new church structure. This structure will be established as a completely new one - at the assembly. At a meeting in which the bishops of all Ukrainian churches will take part. Therefore, this will not be the legitimization of the schism, as some Russian opponents of the Ukrainian autocephaly claim, as no schismatic group will be recognized. Otherwise, these groups will be canceled by the decision of the bishop, who will form a new community. This new community will actually receive the Tomos and, on the basis of Tomos, they will choose their Primate.
RJ: If the autocomplete is given to a new church entity, does the UOC (MP) remain, as recognized by all Orthodox today? Does this mean that we will face the situation that we have in the diaspora – multiple canonical jurisdictions on the same territory: one canonical in the eyes of Moscow, and the other in the eyes of Constantinople. I'm not sure how this way of church organization of the diaspora will lead to some emancipation of the Orthodox in that area? Are you afraid that perhaps the same fate may be waiting for Ukraine, if it is arranged according to this model, i.e. that there will be more an area of conflict, and a smaller area of emancipation?
CH: As I explained earlier, the autocephaly will not be given to any existing schismatic group in Ukraine, but to the new Church. At the same time, you are absolutely right, the jurisdiction of Moscow will continue to exist in Ukraine. Also, you are right when you say that this model will resemble the situation in the diaspora. In my judgment, the diaspora model with many jurisdictions in one place is not ideal, but it is emancipatory for parishes. Communities that can choose between two canonical jurisdictions have the feeling of less pressure from the administrative authorities of the Church. This model is less evil than the existing model where millions of Orthodox believers in Ukraine remain outside the canonical framework. After 2014, thousands of believers left the canonical UOC (MP), because it implicitly supported Russian aggression against Ukraine. Some of them went to the Greek Catholic Church, some to various schismatic communities, and only a few left the Church completely. I think that this is exactly what is becoming a great pastoral problem that constitutes the main concern for the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The Georgian Patriarchate, touching the Ukrainian problem, had two bad choices and chose the least bad solution. This solution is not good, but it's certainly better than keeping the existing status quo.
RJ: In your book Kunstkamera Velikogo i užasnogo you did not spare the criticism of any Church that took part in the Synod of Crete in 2016? I would even say that your criticism of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is more than obvious. Have you changed your attitude towards that Patriarchate in the meantime, believing that the Ecumenical Patriarch should have more power in intra-Orthodox relations?
CH: As a church historian, I cannot idealize the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Nevertheless, in the present omnivorous situation, I believe that Constantinople has a historical role to draw out the churches from, so to speak, the deadlock in which they are now found. It is quite clear to me that most Orthodox churches today are more concerned about their corporate interests than about all-Serbian unity and solidarity. A striking example of this is their attitude regarding the recent wars in Georgia and Ukraine. The only wars we had in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century were wars between Orthodox peoples: Russians and Georgians in 2008 and Russians and Ukrainians in 2014. Just before that, there were wars that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. As intra-Orthodox conflicts, they must be of great interest to all Orthodox churches. Nevertheless, almost all Orthodox churches closed their eyes to these conflicts. Only the Patriarchate of Georgia made a step forward and suggested that something be done on this issue. I consider this to be of paramount importance to global Orthodoxy, and the Ecumenical Patriarchate has proved that it has fully realized its historical role.
RJ: We know from history that almost every Church that sought an autocephaly in the past was put into a long and painful process, filled with conflicts and shames. Do you believe that the Orthodox in the 21st century were called upon to finally learn to come to a dialogue that the process of obtaining autocephaly would not imply conflict from the outset? Or is the process of getting an autocephaly a proof of our inability to talk and discuss problems like Orthodox Christians?
CH: - Autocephaly procedures are almost identical to the procedures of communion: we believe that these things are important to our churches, but we are not able to do it fully in a peaceful manner. The recent Panorthodox Council is a good proof in support of this thesis - all Orthodox Churches were in the preparation of this Council for at least 60 years in the last century, yet some of them in the end refused to participate, in the last moment. I think that the moment when we are able to practice the council and accept the autocephaly with more understanding and less struggle, we can only then claim that all the Orthodox nations are one Church - not only in words but also in deeds.
RJ: In one of your interviews for the Euromaidan Press you mentioned many attempts by the Ukrainians to have their own Church. So, you mentioned the attempt from 1917-1923, but at the same time you avoided the attempt from 1941-1945. years? In both cases, Ukraine was under German occupation? Is the attempt to get an autocephaly from 1941-1945? Is it significant in the struggle for Ukrainian autocephaly?
CH: In some other articles and chapters I dealt with the Ukrainian struggle for autocephaly during the period of the Nazi occupation of Ukraine. During that period, the struggle was supported by the Polish Orthodox Church, which in 1924 won the autocephaly by the Ecumenical Patriarch Vassilios of the XIII. It is important to note that the Nazis were against the autocephaly movement in Ukraine. They believed that this movement helped the Ukrainian rebel army that fought on two fronts: against the Nazis and against the communists. The Nazis preferred to support the movement of "autonomy" that wanted to maintain relations with Moscow, and against the interference of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Ukrainian situation. As can be seen, the movements "for" and "against" the autocephaly of the Church in Ukraine have not changed much since that time.
RJ: How do you see your role in the process of Ukrainian ecclesiastical autocephaly? Do you perceive yourself as an intermediary who brings a dialogue or someone who is fighting for emancipation?
CH: I experience myself, above all, as a mediator in the process of convergence between antagonistic churches. I tried to play this role ten years ago, as long as I was fired by the Department of Foreign Affairs UOC (MP). So, in 2009, I announced the beginning of a dialogue between UOC (MP) and UOC (KP). Three days after that announcement, I was taken to Moscow. For me, this is a clear indication that the Russian Orthodox Church does not want an honest dialogue between churches in Ukraine. The Moscow Patriarchate thus left the emptiness now filled by the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
