The religious situation in Ukraine is entering upon a
critical stage. The situation is a three-vectored issue that involves
Constantinople, Moscow, and Kyiv.
The Russian Orthodox Church has always been a
tool in the hands of the tsars, the commissars, and the new bare-chested star
of the Kremlin. After the fall of the USSR and the ideological vacuum that this
created in Russia, the Church was again pulled into an intimate relationship
with the Kremlin, especially under Vladimir Putin, to offer a conservative and
nationalist vision known as “the Russian world”.
The contrast
with what has occurred in Ukraine is stark. From its independence in 1991 until
earlier this year, no Orthodox Church had as cozy a relationship with the
government. The Orthodox Christians who did not want to belong to the Moscow
Patriarchate were not limited in their freedom by the government, and were free
to organize their Church life as they saw fit, without government intrusion. In
1990 the “Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church” was hastily
renamed the “Ukrainian Orthodox Church” and Moscow bestowed upon it a hitherto
unheard-of and overtly ambiguous status, calling it “independent”, but
strategically avoiding the accepted ecclesiastical terms “autocephalous” or
“autonomous”. In contrast, twenty years earlier in 1970, that same Patriarchate
unambiguously bestowed autocephaly (the highest level of ecclesial self-rule)
on the Orthodox Church in America.
Within just a
few years Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine was split into three major factions:
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP), the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan Patriarchate (UOC-KP) and the Ukrainian
Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC), as well as a number of very small
Orthodox groupings. Moscow has labeled the latter two schismatic and devoid of
grace. Following Moscow’s lead, the rest of the Orthodox world treated these
Churches as illegitimate and refused communion with them. The UOC-MP thus
refers to itself as “the only canonical Church”. When it comes to figuring out
membership, the casual observer is easily confused, as the UOC-MP always counts
parishes, monasteries, and other institutions. Consequently, membership numbers
appear much larger. The UOC-KP, on the other hand, prefers to count members or
percentages of the population, and thus constitutes the majority. The UAOC,
nonetheless, is much smaller than these two ecclesiastical institutions.
The year 2018
turned into a breakthrough year for those Orthodox in Ukraine who simply did
not want to be tied to the Moscow Patriarchate. Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew and the Sacred and Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Constantinople
reasserted authority over the Orthodox Church in Ukraine. It is an incontrovertible
fact that Constantinople is the Mother Church of the Church of Kyiv. Even the
Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church recognizes this while acknowledging (since
1596) the leadership of the Pope of Rome. The Russian Orthodox Church claims
that in 1686, jurisdiction over the Metropolia of Kyiv (which then extended
through modern Ukraine, Belarus and beyond) was transferred by Constantinople
to Moscow. Thus, from the perspective of Moscow, the daughter Church (Moscow,
founded by missionaries from Kyiv) essentially became the mother of its own
Mother Church (Kyiv). But the Ecumenical Patriarchate claims that it did not
transfer jurisdiction over the Metropolia of Kyiv to Moscow in 1686. The
Ecumenical Patriarchate claims it granted the Patriarch of Moscow the right to
ordain the Metropolitan of Kyiv, after his election by a council of the clergy
and laity. This would be done with the proviso that the Metropolitan of Kyiv
was to commemorate the Patriarch of Constantinople, rather than the Patriarch
of Moscow, as his superior. What quickly happened was that the Church of Moscow
arrogated control over the ecclesiastical affairs of the Metropolia of Kyiv.
The Muscovites had interpreted the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav between the
Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi and the tsar as a subjugation rather than
an alliance, as well. As a result, this treaty soon began to interfere in
Ukraine’s internal affairs, finally subjugating the country completely.
All of this
historical information is necessary in order to make sense of what is happening
in present-day Ukraine as of late 2018. In reasserting authority over Ukraine,
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew and his Synod also removed from the heads of
the UOC-KP and the UAOC together with their Churches all ecclesiastical
penalties imposed on them by Moscow, and promised to deliver a Tomos of
Autocephaly (traditional Orthodox document regarding ecclesiastical
independence) to a newly united Ukrainian Orthodox Church. All three Churches
would be considered equally canonical and equally grace-filled. They would
gather together in a Unification Council to be announced shortly, choose a
primate, accept a charter, a draft of which was composed in Constantinople
November 29, 2018, and that primate would be given the Tomos. Moscow claimed that
Constantinople was trespassing onto its canonical territory, and broke
communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, since it had now become schismatic
by consorting with schismatics (the UOC-KP and the UAOC). This is where
problems have begun to arise. Some of the hierarchs of the UOC-MP will
undoubtedly participate in the Unification Council, but others will not. What
will happen to them? During the July 2018 celebration of the 1030th anniversary
of the Christianization of Kyivan Rus’, as well as other occasions, Ukrainian
President Petro Poroshenko very publicly asserted that no one would be forced
to join the newly united and autocephalous (ecclesiastically independent)
Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Those who wish to continue ties with Moscow are
skeptical. Having enjoyed hegemony over Orthodox Christianity in Ukraine for
over 300 years, and having anathematized and reviled rivals, whether Orthodox
or Greco-Catholics (who also have a claim to be one of the inheritors of the
legacy of the Baptism of Rus’ in 1988), those who choose to remain affiliated
with the Patriarch of Moscow, rather than the new head of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church, will have to deal with the fact that they may well become a
minority Church in Ukraine. Forecasts vary as to how many UOC-MP bishops will
join the new Church. The fact that some representatives of the Patriarchate of
Moscow, both in Russia and Ukraine, have supported Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and its adventurism in the Southeastern provinces of Luhansk and
Donetsk, as well as blessing and storing the weapons of the Russian military
and its separatist clients, has already turned many of the faithful Orthodox in
Ukraine against them. Thus, the UOC-MP and the Moscow Patriarchate itself have
been raising the alarm that right wing Ukrainian nationalists (which they
conflate with members of the other two Orthodox jurisdictions) will be seizing
properties by violent means. This may happen in some cases, but we are assured
by the central Ukrainian government that these actions will not be tolerated,
and certainly are not state-sponsored. There are voices in the government and
the UOC-KP who would like to see the UOC-MP change its name to the Russian
Orthodox Church, an idea the Church rejects.
It is
interesting to note that the Moscow Patriarchate constantly refers to the loss
of “canonical territory” and the feared loss of property, while the Ecumenical
Patriarchate pastorally emphasizes bringing millions of the faithful back into
the Orthodox fold and putting an end to enmity among the Orthodox in Ukraine.
His Beatitude Sviatoslav, head of the Ukrainian Greco-Catholic Church, drew
attention to Bartholomew’s approach in statements made during the Papal Synod
on Youth in Rome this Fall.
What will be the
fallout for other religious groups in Ukraine as this continues? Probably none.
Perhaps a few Ukrainian Greco-Catholics will decide to join the new, united and
autocephalous Orthodox Church out a sense of misguided patriotism, but I don’t
expect a mass exodus. Due to their history of persecution by the national
Churches of both Russia and Poland, Ukrainian Greco-Catholics are notoriously
skeptical of alliances between governments and the Church that are too
intimate. Neither will the small Roman Catholic Church in Ukraine get involved.
Various protestant groups (for lack of a better term), especially evangelicals
and pentecostals, who are openly persecuted by Donbas separatists in the name
of Russian Orthodoxy, and reviled as agents of the CIA, EU, or the West in
general, will probably breathe a sigh of relief and simply shake their heads at
the inter-Orthodox squabbles. Jews have no dog in this fight and will probably
feel no difference in this situation. Muslim Tatars constitute probably the
most pro-Ukrainian minority in Ukraine, and, still hurting from Russia’s
seizure of their Crimean homeland, will be happy to see overt Russian influence
via their greatest soft-power tool diminish in Ukraine.
Ukraine is a
multi-ethnic, religiously pluralistic country, with a long history of various
religious communities living side-by-side and exerting mutual influence (with
some unfortunate periods of intolerance, but always while under the rule of
some foreign power). It has an amazing body called the All-Ukrainian Council of
Churches and Religious Organizations that includes all the major Christian
Churches, along with Muslims, and Jews, and fosters dialogue and cooperation
among various religious institutions. This council spoke unanimously in the
most dangerous moments of Russian aggression in Crimea and threats of
separatism after the Revolution of Dignity. This council is Ukraine’s best hope
for both the short and long term. If only the United States or Canada could
have an organization of this kind!
The greatest
threat for Ukraine and all of its religious groups is Putin’s dream of
reconstituting a Russian Empire. The specter of a full-scale invasion of
Ukraine is not just alarmism or some calculation by an unpopular Ukrainian
President. No country that has been fighting a nearly five year hybrid war,
which has lost a very significant and strategic piece of its territory, would
be foolish enough to think that Russia does not have the will to destabilize
and ultimately undermine Ukraine. That constitutes real and present danger for
all the religious groups in Ukraine. The country needs to be left alone. Its
people will sort these things out.
December 11,
2018
Rt. Rev. Mitred
Protopresbyter Andriy Chirovsky, S.Th.D. is Founder,
Metropolitan Andrey Sheptytsky Institute of Eastern Christian Studies, and Full
Professor in the Faculty of Theology, University of St. Michael’s College in
the University of Toronto.