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A collaborator of Patriarch Bartholomew speaks on the clash with the
Partriarchate of Russia for the concession of autocephaly to the Church
of Kiev
It is tempting, albeit naive, to consign a rift between
Constantinople and Moscow—this time over autocephaly in Ukraine—to
internal competition over power and jurisdiction. While not entirely
inaccurate, the reality is far more complex than merely an
inter-Orthodox feud. There are geopolitical ramifications beyond the
religious intrigue, but the matter transcends any exercise of right or
even exhibition of might.
Issues of autocephaly and authority in Ukraine, along with
questions over validity of orders and sacraments, are vital to Orthodox
unity, but these pale before the isolationism and nationalism plaguing
Orthodox Christianity in recent centuries. That is the essential context
of the church situation in Ukraine.
Moscow’s recent response to cut communion with
Constantinople should also be seen in the same light. Its profoundly
demoralizing effect on the wider church—coercing bishops and synods to
choose sides—only underlines how a handful of Orthodox hierarchs make
decisions without concern for or consultation of the lay community,
religious and civil. It would potentially dissipate unity in the
diaspora, where churches of all jurisdictions work together on
missionary and humanitarian work.
Of course, the Orthodox Church is hardly democratic, even
at its most conciliar, instead resembling a mutual interdependence of
hierarchy and laity. The early church understood that the power to
discern authenticity—what Orthodox liturgy calls “rightly dividing the
word of truth”—does not belong to a bishop or synod, but to the church.
So when Moscow challenges Constantinople for restoring millions of
Ukrainian believers to legitimacy and communion, I wonder how it could
brand an entire generation of believers as schismatics in the first
place?
The Ecumenical Patriarchate’s decision—issued last April
and affirmed this month—to grant the requested autocephaly to the
Ukrainian church estranged from Moscow years ago, may be debated in
canon law and argued by historical precedent. But escalating threats and
sweeping reprisals by Moscow bespeak a deeper rationale than
territorial dispute. Russia stands to lose property; but Constantinople
hardly stands to gain power. In the long run, for better or for worse,
the Orthodox Church will acquire a new member—in eerily similar
procedure as many other national churches, including Greece, Bulgaria,
and the Czech Lands, were incorporated. How can a national church, only
recognized as independent last century, complain that recognition of
independent churches in new countries “could directly jeopardize the
unity of the Orthodox Church”?
Is unity an illusion?
Orthodox unity is as impenetrable in mystery as
inaccessible in actuality. Orthodox congratulate themselves for oneness
in doctrine and sacrament. It has long provided a lucrative selling
point to outsiders, while persisting as a romantic notion for insiders.
Yet, if unity and canonicity are anything but legalistic or pietistic,
Orthodox Christians must admit their failure and hypocrisy. It is
disingenuous to brandish unity as a defensive banner or offensive weapon
when internal problems arise. And it is dangerous to associate Orthodox
unity with territorial entitlement, as when Moscow blamed
Constantinople for “crossing a red line and catastrophically undermining
the unity of global Orthodoxy.” One wonders what unity there was in the
first place.
While highly anticipated with hope, unity was revealed an
illusion when the Holy and Great Council convened in Crete (June, 2016)
under the Ecumenical Patriarch for the first time in a millennium. It
became clear then that the Orthodox Church would stubbornly refuse to
enter the twenty-first century without resistance, even resentment. This
was strikingly encapsulated, for example, when Patriarch Bartholomew
drew a line in document drafting sessions, declaring that
bishops-in-council could creatively wordsmith about their relationship
to other Christian communions, but not classify them as heretics.
Incredulous deliberations ensued, with interminable reverberations to
this day in conservative circles. The final resolution—skewed to appease
Russia, Bulgaria and Georgia, who ultimately abstained—was that the
Orthodox Church recognized “the historical name” of other communions
that claimed to be churches!
Bartholomew’s conviction—that the virtually divided
Orthodox Churches needed to think and act together to proclaim a more
convincing contemporary message—encountered the same opposition (and
defamation) he now faces with Ukraine’s autocephaly. The council
provided the appropriate forum for venting religious concerns and
vetting territorial contentions. By not attending, Russia missed a vital
opportunity to demonstrate solidarity and leadership. Today, it
vigorously petitions and pressures for pan-Orthodox consensus to resolve
the dispute. Then, as now, the strategy and action plan were the same:
threat of schism and severance of communion.
Councils are how the church should function. Yet, the Great
Council was less about decisions made or documents signed and more
about the willingness or readiness of the Orthodox Churches to initiate a
more transparent conversation with the modern world, rather than remain
in the cocoon of their medieval past.
An East-West Divide?
When scandalmongering and paranoia—two years ago about the
council in Crete and today about autocephaly in Ukraine—suggests
Constantinople is being coerced or controlled by the U.S. State
Department, what surfaces is a latent hostility toward the West
spearheaded by the Moscow patriarchate. Ideological rhetoric reinforces
the sharp distinction between the sacredness of the Church and the
sinfulness of the West. A prominent Serb bishop suspects “the West is
trying to splinter the Orthodox Church, which is the last mechanism for
uniting the peoples of the ex-USSR and the former Yugoslavia.”
It is convenient to dispute territorial boundaries rather
than debate issues of social justice. There is security in taking pride
on liturgy and spirituality instead of transcending parochialism and
prejudice. It is even appealing to claim evangelical affinity with
conservative Americans, such as US vice president Mike Pence and
evangelical leader Franklin Graham.
In contrast, a culture of openness is fostered by bold
initiative. Bartholomew has affirmed ecumenical and ecological
conversation on all fronts—against unprecedented criticism—recognizing
dialogue as a fundamental response to the Christian vocation. It is this
larger, longer-term picture that he sustains from the unique vantage
point of world leader of Orthodoxy. And he has an uncanny ability to
remain focused on what matters most—keeping the Orthodox Church related
and relevant to the twenty-first century.
Orthodox Churches have much to learn about tolerance—toward
other faiths, other cultures, other churches, other communities.
Bartholomew long assimilated this worldview from the unique history and
legacy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. What entitles him to the
privilege of leadership and responsibility of unity is, paradoxically,
precisely where his antagonists find fault—the frailty of his remnant
church, deprived of national protection—and not some former byzantine
idol or idealistic future ideal.
Orthodox Churches will always contest territorial claims.
But their hierarchs should display prudence and moderation. Stirring a
frenzy of militant mistrust—by speaking of “enemies” outside Mother
Russia—is unacceptable. Threatening violent revolution—by fabricating
analogies with Nazi Germany—is incendiary.
Any reassurance lies in the recognition that divine grace
never abandons the church. Many millions are hoping that church and
civic leaders in Russia and Ukraine can embrace the present moment as an
opportunity of growth and enrichment for God’s people in a region that
has far more to gain from complementarity than conflict, both national
and ecclesiastical.
* Archdeacon of the Ecumenical Throne of
Constantinople and advisor to Patriarch Bartholomew. He teaches
Theology at the Holy Cross Faculty of Boston and coordinates the
initiatives of the Ecumenical Patriarchate on the protection of
creation. He was director of the Press Office of the Pan-Orthodox Synod
of Crete in June 2016. He is the author of numerous publications, while
his biography of Patriarch Bartholomew is about to be published in
Italian for the Dehonian editions.
