.png "English"){kind=small}
The original French version of this wide-ranging article appeared on December 15, the day of the Reunification Council in Kyiv. This explains why a few of the details are already dated. Yet the substance of Prof. Arjakovsky’s commentary remains a valuable contribution to our dialogue on the current state of the Orthodox Church. The author offers much to ponder—and much to debate.
Before the passions presently troubling
Orthodox Christians spin out of control, in this article I wish to set
forth how I see current developments in the Orthodox Church and to offer
my proposals for a way out of the crisis. I have written several books
which study the older and recent history of the Orthodox Church closely,
both in France and around the world, and I have lived a long time in
Ukraine and Russia, two countries in conflict today and situated at the
epicentre of the present crisis. Also because of the friendship that I
feel for Christians in the different Churches in conflict today, I
believe that it’s my responsibility as an Orthodox Christian to share my
opinion without, of course, claiming any exhaustiveness whatever.
Becoming Aware of the Crisis in the Orthodox Church
To begin, I
believe that we must admit that the Orthodox Church has realized for
some years that she is passing through a crisis, which is also a call
from the Spirit. To be convinced of this it suffices to mention the
dozens of subjects of disagreement on the agenda of the pan-Orthodox
council at the start of the 1970s. The fourteen Orthodox Churches
recognized that they were in need of reform. Thus they entered into a
period of thaw which is and will be extremely beneficial to them. That
the pan-Orthodox Council of Crete in 2016 was held after a century of
preparation attests to this thaw. In particular, the recognition by the
fathers of the Council that the borders of the Church of Christ extend
beyond those of the Orthodox Church, and that in consequence the
ecumenical movement is legitimate, was crucial. But the
non-participation of four Churches at this Council showed that the
wounds and the distrust are deep. This is why, conscious that the Spirit
blows in and on the Churches, we must not make quick decisions in
reacting too emotionally to the disappearance of certain elements from
the past which we are in the habit of considering stable, even eternal.
Certainly, the
October 15, 2018 decision of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow to forbid his
faithful to commune at Liturgies celebrated by representatives of
Constantinople is deplorable and attests to an outmoded form of
clericalism. In the same way, the November 27, 2018 decision of
Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople to suppress the Exarchate of
Russian Parishes in Western Europe, made without the least consultation
with Archbishop John of Charioupolis—much less with the faithful of this
Archdiocese—was abrupt and irresponsible. Finally, the often
intransigent attitude of Metropolitan [sic] Filaret of Kyiv,
not only with regard to Moscow but also to Constantinople, gives the
disconcerting impression that he confuses the Church of Kyiv with his
private property. Nevertheless, I believe that we mustn’t focus on these
too human attitudes. On the one hand it is good to understand the sense
of current events and, on the other hand, to look ahead to the future
and to adopt, with wisdom, constructive attitudes.
The most obvious sign of the Orthodox Church’s crisis is that two countries the majority of whose citizens define themselves as Orthodox Christians have been at war for four years,
a violent war which has seen more than 10,000 dead (only on the
Ukrainian side; we do not know the numbers of Russian soldiers and
mercenaries killed in combat), hundreds of thousands of wounded, and
several millions of displaced persons. Even if, in the West, we think of
the Russia-Ukraine war as something faraway, we must all the same
acknowledge that it has a religious component for which the Orthodox
Churches bear a part of the responsibility. We must also admit clearly
that this conflict now threatens to become a new world war.
Moreover, I should clarify that, if I
use a capital letter for the Orthodox Churches, this is because they
call themselves “Orthodox”—but without, for all that, admitting that
they form divine-human realities in which the holiness of the Orthodox
Christian faith is far from always being embodied. Let us think of the
fact that the Moscow Patriarchate has not once condemned the annexation
of Crimea, which was however an obvious violation of international law,
which is the basis of world peace. Neither has the Moscow Patriarchate
condemned “the Orthodox army of the Donbas,” despite the fact that its
fighters claim to be adherents of the Russian Church. On the side of the
Patriarchate of Constantinople there was also no condemnation of this
annexation at the moment in 2014 that it took place. We also know that
the creation of the Kyiv Patriarchate has not been long, peaceful
process.
Acknowledging the Legitimacy of the Formation of an Autocephalous Church of Kyiv
The situation
of schism among three Orthodox Churches in Ukraine is one of the reasons
for the Kremlin’s non-recognition of Ukrainian identity. This
situation, which wounds a great many families painfully, was not tenable
in the long term. The Orthodox Church in Ukraine, more than 25 million
faithful strong, has been asking for autocephaly for at least a century;
and, if we add up its three jurisdictions, it constitutes the main
Orthodox Church in Europe. We must be grateful to Patriarch Bartholomew
for taking the bull of this division by the horns, despite his advanced
age. He acted with wisdom in listening patiently for 27 years to all the
parties of the conflict, the Churches but also the recent presidents of
the Ukrainian republic and the National Assembly of Ukraine [the
Verkhovna Rada], which voted twice with a very large majority in favour
of his intervention in 2016 and 2018.
Patriarch Bartholomew also reminded us,
by setting forth very clear arguments, of the legitimacy of his
authority to try to care for this open wound in the heart of Europe. The
Patriarch of Constantinople has had precedence in the Church, after the
See of Rome, since the Fourth Ecumenical Council, precedence
which—since the schism with the Roman Church—has taken the form of
Petrine responsibility (the right to convoke councils, the right of
appeal, the right to recognize autocephalous status…). On December 4,
2018 Bishop Makarios of Christoupolis explained perfectly to the
European parliamentarians in Brussels that it was in fact the Ecumenical
Patriarchate that granted autocephaly to the Churches of Moscow (1589),
Greece (1850), Serbia (1879), Romania (1885), Poland (1924), Albania
(1937), Bulgaria (1945), Georgia (1990), and the Czech Lands (1998).
What’s more, the Church of Constantinople was at the origins of the
foundation of the Church of Kyiv in 988, and accompanied it until the
17th century. Despite what Metropolitan Kallistos Ware says, in 1686
Constantinople only assigned to the Church of Moscow the possibility of
designating the Metropolitan of Kyiv provisionally, with the condition
that he would recognize the Patriarch of Constantinople as his Primate.
Furthermore, the Ukrainian Church in the immigration asked
Constantinople, not Moscow, for [canonical] recognition. This is why it
was integrated in 1994 within the Ecumenical Patriarchate.
After the three Maidans of 1991, 2004,
and 2014, Patriarch Bartholomew recognized that the Ukrainian nation
wanted no more division among Christians. Informed of the fact that,
since 1991, the totality of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops had asked for
autocephaly, and equally conscious of the responsibility of the Churches
in maintaining this division and in the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
Patriarch Bartholomew very wisely decided to give Ukrainian Orthodox
Christians the possibility of forming their own Church. As opinion polls
show, the great majority of Orthodox Christians in Ukraine are very
grateful today to Patriarch Bartholomew for his involvement in the
process of assigning—in principle on January 6, 2019 in
Istanbul—autocephalous status to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
In addition,
the Ukrainian government has promised to the Orthodox faithful wishing
to remain within the Patriarchate of Moscow that they will be free to do
so. The only change will consist in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
[UOC-MP] taking the name of Exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate in
Ukraine. On their side, the bishops who participated in the
Reconciliation Council of December 15, 2018 have appealed to their
faithful to refuse any form of violence at the moment where parishes
will have to choose whether or not to take part in this Church of Kyiv.
Rediscovering the Path of Humility and the Sense of Service to Overcome the Double Temptation of Quietism and Clericalism
It’s clear that all Orthodox Christians
bear responsibility for the present crisis, which translates in
particular into a schism between Moscow and Constantinople and a war
between Moscow and Kyiv.
Elsewhere
I have written that the majority of the faithful have for a long time
lost the sense of the Orthodox faith as a synthesis between four
fundamental, existential positions, four definitions of the Church, and
four relationships to the truth as right glory, correct truth, faithful
memory, and knowledge of justice. Many laypeople have come to separate
faith and reason and to fall asleep in a form of liturgical quietism, of
a narrow, confessional, pseudo-patristic way of thinking disconnected
from the realities of the world.
But the hierarchs of the Churches of
Kyiv, Moscow, and Constantinople must also recognize humbly their fears,
weaknesses, and limitations if they wish to embody the hierarchal
expression of the Orthodox faith in the Church of Christ.
On the part of one Church, the Kyiv
Patriarchate—which has had to navigate alone for three decades—there is a
fear of being again manipulated by its Mother-Church. It is indeed true
that, in the past, this Church of Kyiv has had to suffer abandonment
not only by Moscow but also by Constantinople. Here is where, it seems
to me, Ukrainian Christians must show some historical discernment. To
live in a position of inter-ecclesial openness and communion is more
demanding that to live alone with oneself. But the mission of any Church
is to follow the path to the Kingdom of God. Today Metropolitan [sic]
Filaret of Kyiv must humbly accept to be led by the Patriarch of
Constantinople on the path of inter-ecclesial recognition. In particular
he must accept the fact that the bishops can only govern (that is,
serve) by being accompanied by the priests and laity. This will permit
the Church of Kyiv to actualize the truth of the Church according to
which, in Christ, each baptized person is called to become king, priest,
and prophet. Thus will this Church show the other Orthodox Churches how
to heal the diseases of ethnophyletism and clericalism.
This decision by Patriarch Bartholomew
to involve himself in the destiny of the Church of Kyiv has provoked the
anger of the Moscow Patriarchate, which considered Ukraine to be part
of its “canonical territory.” The Moscow Patriarchate has justified its
henceforth open claim to take over the leadership of the Orthodox Church
by the fact that, after the Council of Florence (1439), the Church of
Constantinople had fallen into schism, which would explain the
self-founding of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1448. In reality this view
of history is false. On the one hand, the Council of Florence was
adopted by the near totality of Orthodox bishops and therefore could not
be considered as heretical. (The Church of Constantinople only rejected
it in 1484 while the Church of Kyiv remained faithful to it until the
17th century.) On the other hand we know that the See of Moscow was
itself under Muslim domination in the 15th century. Yet again, the
mythology on which the Russian Church has fed since its founding,
namely, of being “the Third Rome” and sole inheritor of the Christian
Empire, was based on a non-Christian political theology.
This Church of Moscow came to contest
the leadership of the Church of Constantinople by relying on an
ultra-autocephalist ecclesiology. This depends largely on political
power and refuses any ecclesial authority outside of itself. Now, as has
been shown very well by Professor [and Protopresbyter] John Erickson,
Orthodox ecclesiology is based on communion among the Churches, in the
image of trinitarian life, which involves at the same time the principle
of primacy, that is, of a real, personal authority, of conciliar
(synodal) life, and of the participation of every baptized person.
Today’s theologians who call themselves Orthodox yet seek to contest the
Patriarch of Constantinople’s position as protos relative to
the Churches call into question at one and the same time the history of
the Orthodox Church, as recognized by the greatest historians from Anton
Kartachev to John Meyendorff, and the authority of the Ecumenical
Councils.
It seems to me that Russian Orthodox
hierarchs, theologians, and quite simply the laity should undertake in
our day the work of discernment. It is the interests of the Russian
Church to propose a path of renewal, faithful to the living Tradition,
for the Orthodox Church as well as for the Russian nation. The Church of
Moscow in particular must free itself from its Third Rome mythology and
realize that it is not the sole inheritor of Kyivan Rus’. If not, as
the last pan-Orthodox council showed in Crete, the Russian Church could
be carried away by the most fundamentalist currents which confuse the
Church with the state and propagate more and more deadly imperialist
ideas. To support the formation of an autocephalous Church in Ukraine
would be an opportunity to establish a peaceful dialogue with the
Ukrainian nation. Over time this Church of the Moscow Patriarchate—about
which we know that only 5% of Russian citizens today attend the Sunday
Liturgy—could position itself as an advocate for Russian-Ukrainian peace
and in this way win back the confidence of the Russian people. I add
here that it’s not by proposing to create an ethnic church to Orthodox
Christians living elsewhere in the world, even for those of Russian
origin, that the Moscow Patriarchate will prepare for the future in a
spiritual manner. Everyone knows, in fact, that in Christ there is
neither Jew nor Greek.
Finally, it is
irresponsible and deeply offensive that, on November 27, 2018, the
Patriarchate of Constantinople wished to place its [Russian] Exarchate
[in Western Europe], and its Exarch first of all, before the fait accompli
of its suppression. This is not the way to establish confidence among
Christians in the Church of Christ. Certainly Patriarch Bartholomew
assures these Christians that their spiritual and liturgical traditions
will be respected. Equally certainly, everyone can understand that, in a
time of acute schism, the Patriarch of Constantinople would need clear
compliance on the part of this Exarchate’s parishes, especially after
the recent defection of the church in Florence. But the Patriarchate of
Constantinople seems not to realize the extent to which, in adhering to
the 1917 Council of the Russian Church, the archdiocese of Russian
parishes in Western Europe has had the time to form its own, original
consciousness, certainly imperfect, but nevertheless producing good
fruits throughout the history of the 20th century. To suppress this
tradition of the Council of 1917 with the stroke of pen is naive. To
wish to crush this [Archdiocese’s] proper consciousness is an offense
against the Spirit.
Possible Scenarios for a Way Out of the Ecclesial Crisis in Western Europe
This is why it
would appear wise to me for everyone to recognize his or her mistakes
and for a double movement of reconciliation to take place:
On the one hand the Patriarch of
Constantinople must quickly reinstate His Eminence John of Charioupolis
as Archbishop, with very precise competencies and a mode of functioning
guaranteed for the Archdiocese, such that these parishes can have the
assurance of being able to live according to their specific traditions.
It would be equally indispensable for Patriarch Bartholomew to make some
gesture of friendship and confidence with regard to Archbishop John of
Charioupolis and the faithful of his Archdiocese, who have been
painfully affected by the Patriarch’s too hasty decision.
On the other hand, it would be good if
the members of this old Exarchate accepted to acknowledge that their
mission consists in forming a post-ethnic local Church which, by
definition, means a close collaboration with the Ecumenical
Patriarchate—which, let us admit it, has not happened before now. This
Church must also liberate itself from the narrowness connected with its
minority status and notably from its often triumphalist reading of its
own history. I add here that the See of Constantinople has welcomed
Russian parishes in diaspora over several decades, which helped the
Russian diaspora to avoid both the risk of manipulation by the Moscow
Patriarchate during the era of the Soviet regime and the agony
experienced by the parishes which placed themselves under the
jurisdiction of the Russian Church Abroad. It would be good to show
gratitude to Constantinople in return at a moment where it too needs
support.
In case Constantinople refused to
acknowledge its hastiness, grant these guarantees, and adopt a true
pastoral attitude, there would remain two solutions to the dissolved
Archdiocese: either to begin the process of forming a local, autonomous
Church—but this would mean entering into a particularly perilous
ecclesial-juridical void, given the Archdiocese’s lack of strength and
meager capabilities; or, scatter among the different canonical Churches
existing in Western Europe (Moscow, Bucharest, Kyiv, Antioch, etc.). But
here too, nothing would guarantee that this Archdiocese’s “own spirit”
be preserved enduringly and enriched. In the latter case at any rate, as
a minimum in the short term, there would be need of a document which
could guarantee the preservation of their particular spirit. Be that as
it may, if the Russian parishes in Western Europe under the Patriarchate
of Constantinople do not show spiritual discernment, seek to move
beyond their national tropism, and accept to overcome their legitimate
unhappiness with regard to clericalism, they will quite simply be swept
away by history.
In the opposite case where the
Ecumenical Patriarch refuses to leave behind his clerical style of
management and does not accept to revisit the hazardous decision of his
Synod on November 27, 2018, Constantinople can only discover—but too
late—that it has lost the leadership over the Orthodox Churches outside
its canonical territory (already the case for Moscow, but this
non-recognition will only grow). The loss of the presidency of the
Episcopal Assemblies, created everywhere around the world particularly
at the initiative of members of the Rue Daru Exarchate, could prove
fatal in the end for Constantinople’s authority around the world.
This is why, in my opinion, the primary task for finding a way out of this crisis that would be acceptable to all parties is to define together, quickly, in 2019, with the bishops, priests, and lay members of the Rue Daru Archdiocese (also with, if possible, the participation of Orthodox Christians from other jurisdictions as observers), this spirit or this identity proper to the Orthodox Church of France (this work must also be done in Belgium, Great Britain, Germany, etc. …), and to show its compatibility with a renewed, global, pan-Orthodox governance.
This particular spirit of the
Archdiocese is found, in my opinion, in light of the debates of the 1917
Council of Moscow (which rehabilitated not only the power of the
Primate in the Church, but also re-established the election of bishops,
the active role of the laity in the Church, ecumenical engagement,
theological creativity, the personalist and sapiential reconciliation of
faith and reason, the condemnation of capital punishment, the
separation of Church and state…). These ideas at once traditional and
new were put progressively into practice thanks to enlightened bishops
and theologians, from Metropolitan Evlogy (Georgievsky) to Archbishop
John (Renneteau), from Father Sergius Bulgakov to Olivier Clément, and
have given numerous signs of holiness universally recognized. This
Archdiocese-become-Exarchate has contributed in fact with ACER
[a Russian Orthodox student organization in France], St. Sergius
Institute, Orthodox Action, Syndesmos, the Orthodox Fraternity in
Western Europe, etc., to inventing a new theology—creative, personalist,
sophiological, and trinitarian (even if it is true that, for different
reasons to which we must come back, notably a mythified and
anti-ecumenical vision of the past, this living Tradition was lost in
the sands of time…), and to thinking a new, post-ethnic ecclesiology as
well as an ecumenical future for the Orthodox Church of France.
For this local Church of France in
process of being formed has, as its originality (this observation
applies to most countries of the world outside of the Eastern
Mother-Churches), the fact of finding itself on the canonical territory
of the Catholic Church (which has always been recognized by the Orthodox
Churches). Over time, once everyone admits that the divisions of the
past have been understood and surpassed by the best Catholic and
Orthodox theologians, this local Orthodox Church of France could have
sufficient autonomy to be in a position to propose a particular mode of
ecclesial life in double communion—with both Rome and Constantinople—as
was the case for the Christians of first-millennium Gaul.
This Orthodox Church of France could
also recover fraternal communion with the Greek Catholic or Melkite
Churches, and with certain Eastern Churches called non-Chalcedonian,
because they too have suffered in the past from divisions among their
Mother-Churches. These, in most cases, seek today to rediscover the
fundamental unity of the Church of Christ while firmly rejecting any
form of malevolent proselytism. Their reflections, notably in the matter
of canon law, and their practice, particularly in their permanent
dialogue with the Roman Church, could prove particularly beneficial to
the group of Orthodox Churches which define themselves as
Chalcedonian.
Conclusion
It seems to me that, despite all the
wounds of each Church and all the sufferings of each Orthodox Christian
in this period of upheavals, it is necessary in the first place to
support the Patriarchate of Constantinople in its will to re-establish
not only an organ of pan-Orthodox coordination but also its proper
authority. We have understood that it’s a matter of conditional support,
tied to the Apostle Andrew’s ability to respond to the call of Christ
to follow Him. Even while making bold decisions which arise from his
sole responsibility, the Patriarch of Constantinople must make use of
canon 34 of the Council of the Apostles:
The bishops
of each nation must know the one among them who is first, and consider
him as their head, and do nothing exceptional without his opinion. Each
of them must do only what applies to his diocese and the territories
dependent on him. But let the first neither do anything without the
opinion of all the others. Thus concord will reign, and God—the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Spirit—will be glorified in the Lord through
the Holy Spirit.
For all that this canon does not mean that, in times of crisis (which is by definition the time of human history), the protos
can benefit from the support of all at every moment. That has never
happened in the history of the Church. The group of fourteen Orthodox
Churches must acknowledge this point and admit that, in the historical
dynamic of the Councils, moreover of the position of the protos,
the qualified majority has often been recognized as a sign of the Holy
Spirit’s action allowing a wide reception by the whole Church of the
decisions adopted. The protos must therefore show boldness in
applying this rule of ecclesial life. Now, precisely, Patriarch
Bartholomew shows great boldness today.
But, as we have
said, the re-establishment of his will to act, after centuries of
paralysis, is being done too abruptly. This is why his boldness will be
all the more recognized and rewarded if it is accompanied by evidence of
humility and listening. The Orthodox Church in its totality must repent
visibly of its sins, as the Catholic Church itself did in 2000, and
realize that its reform is truly necessary. Orthodox bishops in
particular must learn the lessons of the past, as much from their
weakness with regard to secular authorities as from their unbalanced
governance, resulting in alternating periods of imperial management with
long periods of irregular or questionable councils. The laity must also
recognize that centuries of inaction have a price today.
Prayer and
ascesis, the true self-critical humility recommended by St. Ephraim the
Syrian, these are the indispensable conditions for coming out of the
current crisis. But it is also necessary today, in a spirit of peace and
a manner both personal and communitarian, to accomplish a labour of
creative reflection. The heart of the necessary reform is going to
consist, for all Orthodox Christians, in ridding ourselves of the
heresies of life as much as dogmatic heresies. It is necessary to be
aware of the “monophysite” or “phyletistic” temptations of which our
Church is often the consenting victim. It is also fitting to rid
ourselves of the supreme heresy, namely, that loss of hope which
translates into pride, the will for power, clericalism, non-listening to
one another, anger, the non-desire to understand each other mutually,
and ultimately, indifference, sadness, and the loss of love.
This essay appeared in French on Dr. Arjakovsky’s personal blog on December 15, 2018. Translated for Orthodoxy in Dialogue by Giacomo Sanfilippo.
See the extensive Ukraine section and the Christian Unity and Ecumenism section in our Archives by Author.
Antoine Arjakovsky holds a PhD from
the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS: School of
Higher Studies in the Social Sciences) at the University of Paris. He is
an Orthodox Christian, French historian, research director at the
Collège des Bernardins in Paris, and founding director of the Institute
of Ecumenical Studies at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv. His What is Orthodoxy? A Genealogy of Christian Understanding appeared in October 2018.
