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Georgian Orthodox Patriarch Ilia II (Source: orthochristian.com)
The main political theme in Georgia in recent days has been the
position of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) regarding the recognition
of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church. On December 27, the
Georgian Patriarchate declared that the Holy Synod—the main
decision-making body of the GOC—had met to discuss the situation in
Ukraine and the broader Orthodox World following the decision of the
Patriarch of Constantinople to grant autocephaly to Kyiv. According to
the GOC Patiarchate, however, the Georgian Holy Synod decided not to
voice an official position on the issue (Civil.ge, January 8, 2019).
The official representative of the Patriarchate in Tbilisi said that
discussions regarding Ukrainian autocephaly would continue during
subsequent meetings of the Holy Synod. Reportedly, at the December 27
gathering, two letters were read out: the first from the Ecumenical
Patriarch of Constantinople, Bartholomew I, asking the other Orthodox
Churches to support his decision to grant a tomos (decree) of
autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church, and the second from Patriarch
Kirill of Moscow, calling on Georgia’s Patriarch Ilia II to condemn the
“non-canonical” decision by Constantinople (Civil.ge, January 8, 2019).
“It is sad that the Russian Church stopped communicating with
Constantinople. The Ecumenical Patriarchate began the procedure for
granting autocephaly to Ukraine. This deepened the crisis. But Church
history knows many crises that God managed to overcome,” Patriarch Ilia
declared (Civil.ge, January 8, 2019).
Many in Tbilisi and Kyiv had hoped that the Georgian Orthodox Church
would be the first to announce support for Ukraine’s autocephaly. Last
autumn, while visiting Washington, DC, the head of the independent
Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kyiv Patriarchate said that he expects support
from the “Georgian Brothers.” While speaking at an event hosted by the
Atlantic Council, Patriarch Filaret noted, “Georgia and Ukraine have
both suffered from Russian aggression. So Georgia must support us. We
are Orthodox, and we are obliged to pray together” (YouTube, September 19, 2018).
The ruling Georgian Dream party, Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze and
President Salome Zurabishvili have all come out in support of the
Georgian Church’s “caution” on the Ukrainian issue. At her first press
conference since being elected head of state last November, Zurabishvili
told journalists that, despite the expectations of many Georgian
politicians, she does not intend to congratulate Ukraine on attaining
autocephaly. “It would be very easy [personally] to congratulate
Ukrainians over the independence of their Church because this would be
very natural considering our historical experience. But today, I am not
speaking in my personal capacity, I am speaking as the president, and I
have a huge responsibility to bear,” she noted. Zurabishvili added, “If
the Georgian Orthodox Church is cautious [out of a concern for] certain
consequences, which everyone knows, but of which I will not speak of
today, I cannot assume the responsibility for aggravating the
situation,” (Civil.ge, January 12, 2019).
The Georgian authorities’ meek stance generated outrage among the
opposition. “It is strange, that a diplomat from the French school,
Salome Zurabishvili, who grew up in France [Zurabishvili previously held
French citizenship and has served as France’s ambassador to Tbilisi],
declares her unwillingness to recognize the autocephaly of Ukraine,”
David Berdzenishvili, one of the leaders of the Republican Party of
Georgia, told this author on January 12. He stressed that the issue of
the Ukrainian Church’s independence “is not only a religious issue, but
also a geopolitical one. […] There is a battle for the future of Ukraine
and all of Europe. That is why US Secretary of State [Michael] Pompeo
congratulated Ukrainians on achieving autocephaly,” Berdzenishvili
underscored. Additionally, he cited the late former US National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s well-known contention that “without
Ukraine, Russia can no longer become an empire.”
Berdzenishvili expressed confidence that the GOC will soon be forced
to recognize the Kyiv Church’s autocephaly, in order not to be isolated
within the Orthodox World. At the same time, Berdzenishvili shared with
the author some alleged details of the last meeting of the Holy Synod.
According to him, 10 of the 47 members of the Holy Synod “openly called
for the immediate recognition of the independence of the Ukrainian
Church.” The caution of the rest of the hierarchs of the Georgian
Church, Berdzenishvili argued, can be explained by “their close ties
with Russia and the activity of the Russian special services” (Author’s
interview, January 12).
Meanwhile, Katie Khatiashvili, a correspondent with the Tbilisi newspaper Prime Time,
suggested another possible reason behind the Georgian hierarchs’
apprehension about recognizing the independence of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church. “They fear, that the autocephaly of Ukraine will set a
precedent for recognizing the autocephaly of Abkhazia, just like Moscow
used the precedent of Kosovo’s independence to recognize the
independence of Georgian autonomies Abkhazia and South Ossetia 11 years
ago,” Khatiashvili said (Author’s interview, January 12). For now, the
Russian Orthodox Church recognizes the territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia as being under the jurisdiction of the Georgian Church.
Paata Zakareishvili, a former Georgian state minister for
reconciliation and civil equality, told this author that Moscow has no
legal right to recognize the independence of the Abkhaz Church. Hence,
Zakareishvili advised the Georgian hierarchs to “support the Western,
progressive, Constantinople Church” (Author’s interview, January 12).
The apparent limited independence of the Georgian Patriarchy from
Moscow has repeatedly come under criticism in recent years, particularly
since the Russian war against Ukraine (see EDM, January 11, 2013; February 19, 2016; November 7, 2017).
And some pro-Western members of the opposition have additionally
rebuked the GOC for pushing an anti-liberal and even pro-Moscow agenda
in the country (see EDM,
April 15, 2013). Indeed, recently, Patriarch Ilia II called for
imposing greater restrictions on the press: “Unfortunately, it happens
very frequently that freedom of speech is misused and reality is
presented in a distorted manner,” Ilia II wrote in his Christmas epistle (Patriarchate.ge, January 6, 2019; Civil.ge,
January 8, 2019). One of the leaders of the opposition European Georgia
party, Sergo Ratiani, expressed concern, that the government might
exploit the Patriarch’s opinion in order to restrict freedom of speech
in the country (Author’s interview, January 6, 2019).
